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ABSTRACT
In November 1908, the international community tried to buy its way 
out of the century’s first recognized humanitarian crisis: King Leopold 
II’s exploitation and abuse of the Congo Free State. And although the 
oppression of Leopold’s reign is by now well recognized, little attention
has been paid to the mechanism that ended it—a purchased transfer of 
sovereign control. Scholars have explored Leopold’s exploitative
acquisition and ownership of the Congo and their implications for 
international law and practice. But it was also an economic transaction 
that brought the abuse to an end.
The forced sale of the Congo Free State is our starting point for 
asking whether there is, or should be, an exception to the absolutist 
conception of territorial integrity that dominates traditional
international law. In particular, we ask whether oppressed regions
should have a right to exit—albeit perhaps at a price—before the
relationship between the sovereign and the region deteriorates to the 
level of genocide.
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INTRODUCTION
On November 15, 1908, Belgium concluded an agreement with its 
own king, Leopold II. By the terms of the agreement, Leopold sold
control over the Congo Free State—a massive private colony seventy
times larger than Belgium itself. He did not give it up voluntarily, and 
Belgium did not accept it enthusiastically. But the documentation of 
abuses conducted by Leopold’s minions had resulted in one of the 
world’s first international human rights movements,1 and the Belgian 
government—which had resisted the colony all along—had little choice
but to purchase sovereign control of the Congo from its reluctant king. 
In 1909, the American Journal of International Law published an 
article, “The Origin of the Congo Free State” by Jesse Siddal Reeves.2 
Like almost all discussion of the Congo Free State in international law 
literature, Reeves’s article addressed how the international community
had allowed the king of Belgium, through a personally controlled 
entity, to take sovereign control of the country in 1885. Reeves noted 
that international pressure had brought the Free State to an end,3 but 
1. See ADAM HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD’S GHOST: A STORY OF GREED, TERROR, AND 
HEROISM IN COLONIAL AFRICA 2 (1999); JASON K. STEARNS, DANCING IN THE GLORY OF
MONSTERS: THE COLLAPSE OF THE CONGO AND THE GREAT WAR OF AFRICA 7 (2012).
 2. Jesse S. Reeves, The Origin of the Congo Free State, Considered from the Standpoint of
International Law, 3 AM. J. INT’L L. 99 (1909). 
3. Id. at 99–100 (“The coercive power of ultranational public opinion . . . has been plainly 
evident in the case of the Congo State. Public sentiment, transcending national boundaries, has
BLOCHER & GULATI IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/2020 7:11 PM         
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
  
  
 
   
   
  
 
2020] TRANSFERABLE SOVEREIGNTY 1221
neither he nor the wider literature that followed explored the 
significance of that event, nor the remarkable fact that Belgium paid 
King Leopold a hefty price to exit.
This Article is about such moments: transfers of sovereign control, 
and what they suggest about how international law and practice can 
respond to problems of oppression and bad governance. It focuses in 
particular on the specific mechanism—the forced sale—that brought 
Leopold’s reign to an end.4 That method of transfer, we suggest, might 
sometimes be preferable to the alternatives. Why not permit an 
oppressed or even ill-governed region to either purchase its own
freedom—or at least a change in government—or allow the 
international community to do so on its behalf?5 
The story of the Congo is tragically illustrative. Leopold treated
the Congo and its people as little more than a factory designed to
enrich him, at immense human cost.6 Eventually, reformers like
George Washington Williams, Edmund Dene Morel, Roger Casement, 
and others were able to shine light on his atrocities, forcing the Western
powers to confront the horrors unleashed when they recognized 
Leopold’s claim and brought the Congo Free State into existence in the 
first place.7 
Modern international law and practice provide several options for 
addressing these kinds of tragedies, reflecting different approaches to 
sovereignty and state incentives. Some of these methods are external, 
originating outside the troubled state. Condemnation by the 
international community and economic sanctions are generally 
designed to deter bad behavior—to improve the exercise of sovereign 
control without necessarily changing who exercises it. Where those fail,
if the level of abuse is truly awful—as has been the case in recent years 
in Rwanda, Kosovo, Libya, and Syria—members of the international 
community might intervene to constrain or remove the oppressive 
government. As of this writing in early 2020, there is talk of doing the 
same in Venezuela. Such external interventions are the subject of legal,
demanded a responsible government for the Congo. It has accomplished practically all that the
concerted action of the powers might have sought to do.”).
4. As we will emphasize throughout, the end of Leopold’s reign did not mean freedom for
the Congo, which remained a Belgian colony. The improvement was nonetheless significant. See 
infra notes 173–85 and accompanying text.
5. We explore this possibility in Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, A Market for Sovereign
Control, 66 DUKE L.J. 797 (2017) [hereinafter Blocher & Gulati, A Market for Sovereign Control].
 6. See infra Part I.B.
 7. See infra Part I.B.
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1222 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1219
political, and scholarly debates about territorial sovereignty, human 
rights, and the responsibility to protect.  
There are also internal options: things that the people of the 
nation can do to help themselves. They might try to improve their lot 
politically either by pressuring their current leaders to enact reforms or
by choosing new leaders. Where “voice” fails, they might exit.8 At the
individual level, this often means migration—a status chosen by, or 
forced upon, more people today than ever before.9 In extreme cases,
entire regions might be able to secede, though that is costly and 
difficult, as the struggles of Kosovo, East Timor, and the Kurds 
demonstrate. Such internal options are the focus of legal, political, and 
scholarly debates about the rule of law, self-determination, migration,
and borders. 
External and internal remedies to the problems of bad governance
are complex and distinct from one another. But at any rate they all alter 
the exercise of sovereign control—the power of a recognized 
sovereign, usually a nation-state, to exercise governing authority in a
particular territory, without restriction by some superior authority.10 
Some remedies change how that power is exercised, shaping incentives 
through the application of sanctions, political pressure, or threats of
military intervention. Others change who can exercise it, by breaking 
the malfunctioning link between the sovereign and the people.11 But
8. See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970) (examining 
the mechanisms of voice and exit that people use to demonstrate their displeasure to a controlling 
entity).
 9. See Somini Sengupta, 60 Million People Fleeing Chaotic Lands, U.N. Says, N.Y. TIMES
(June 18, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/18/world/60-million-people-fleeing-chaotic-
lands-un-says.html [https://perma.cc/36F5-L4XK] (quoting United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees Antó nio Guterres as calling the current mass displacement situation
“unprecedented”). 
10. We did not enter this project with a narrow position about what “sovereignty” means— 
one purpose of the project is to illustrate the forms it can take. For purposes of getting the analysis
off the ground, though, our working definition is basically that of the positivists. See generally A.
V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 27 (Liberty Fund
1982) (1885) (“[T]he term ‘sovereignty’ . . . is a merely legal conception, and means simply the
power of law-making unrestricted by any legal limit.”); see also  NEIL MACCORMICK,
QUESTIONING SOVEREIGNTY: LAW, STATE, AND NATION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMONWEALTH
127 (1999) (“Sovereign power is, then, territorial in character, and is power not subject to
limitation by higher or coordinate power.”). For a historical and conceptual analysis, see generally
DIETER GRIMM, SOVEREIGNTY: THE ORIGIN AND FUTURE OF A POLITICAL AND LEGAL
CONCEPT (Dick Howard ed., Belinda Cooper trans., Columbia Univ. Press 2015) (2009).
 11. Cf. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776) (“When in the [c]ourse
of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have 
connected them with another . . . .”).
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2020] TRANSFERABLE SOVEREIGNTY 1223
sometimes these mechanisms do not work, especially when particular 
minority populations are disenfranchised and systematically oppressed 
by the majority, and the powerful nations of the world are unable or 
unwilling to expend the kinds of resources that would stop that 
oppression. The Rohingya in Myanmar—often referred to as the 
“World’s Least-Wanted”—come to mind.12 Could some version of the 
1908 forced sale help oppressed peoples like the Rohingya of the 
Rakhine State? 
It is the latter kind of change that interests us here and that we 
find particularly arresting about the story of the Congo. Contemporary 
discussions about changing sovereign control tend to focus on toppling 
the government through military intervention and regime change,13 
separating the region from the rest of the nation through secession and 
liberation, or helping people escape through migration.14 
Our goal is to recover and reevaluate the possibility of forced sales 
as solutions to problems of bad governance. As a matter of law, politics, 
and morality, King Leopold’s crimes are beyond the pale. The 
international community has internalized that lesson, at least. But in 
focusing on the substance of the wrong, there is a risk of missing the 
value of the remedy—it was not simply, as is sometimes said, an
abdication,15 a demand by Belgium,16 or a simple annexation;17 rather,
it was a forced sale. Both elements of the transfer raise important 
questions: it was forced, and it was a sale.
As to the former, international pressure was such that Leopold
had little choice but to give up sovereign control. This may seem 
obvious; a ruler who oppresses “his” people to such a degree must 
surely be stopped. But to treat sovereignty as something that can be
12. The Rohingya: World’s Least-Wanted People, RADIO FREE ASIA, 
https://www.rfa.org/english/news/special/rohingya-crisis/?_ga=2.229788570.74016411.1561381024-
187834459.1561035733 [https://perma.cc/9J2U-ZHLF]; see also, e.g., Shibani Mahtani, Vice
President Pence Pushes Myanmar’s Suu Kyi on Rohingya, Jailed Journalists, WASH. POST (Nov. 
14, 2018, 6:21 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/vice-president-pence-
pushes-myanmars-suu-kyi-on-rohingya-jailed-journalists/2018/11/14/f3fca8e8-e73d-11e8-b8dc-
66cca409c180_story.html [https://perma.cc/JF6S-B99V].
 13. See infra note 270 and accompanying text.
 14. See infra note 207 and accompanying text.
 15. See, e.g., SAMUEL H. NELSON, COLONIALISM IN THE CONGO BASIN 1880–1940, at 79
(1994). 
16. ROGER ANSTEY, KING LEOPOLD’S LEGACY: THE CONGO UNDER BELGIAN RULE
1908–1960, at 261 (1966).
 17. Stefan Heym, Introduction to MARK TWAIN, KING LEOPOLD’S SOLILOQUY 11, 22–23
(Int’l Publishers & Seven Seas Books 1971) (1961) (“In 1908, the Congo Free State was taken out
of the King’s hands and simply annexed to Belgium.”). 
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forfeited is radical in another sense. It suggests that sovereigns,
supposedly unrestrained by legal limits,18 in fact must  answer to a 
higher authority or obligation—a point that would eventually become
prominent in the theory and practice of international human rights. At 
the time, however, imperialism and colonialism were still thriving.
Another half century would pass before concepts like “crimes against 
humanity,” “genocide,” “remedial secession,” and “responsibility to 
protect” truly became prominent in international law.19 
In the context of the Congo and other colonial ventures, the 
contemporary debate tended to be about the duties accompanying the 
establishment of sovereignty—how much a would-be sovereign had to 
do to demonstrate the necessary exclusive control.20 Describing that
threshold meant putting meat on the bones of the concept of 
sovereignty and what it means to govern. If failure to govern could 
moot a claim to sovereignty at the moment of attempted acquisition, 
could it do the same on the back end, as a kind of forfeit? If so, at what 
cost? 
For some, the intuitive answer is that sovereignty is 
noncommodifiable as a normative matter or nontransferable as a 
practical matter.21 But as a matter of international law and practice, this 
is not true. Although history has repudiated Leopold’s brutal rule and
law has evolved to prevent its recurrence,22 international law and
18. See supra note 10. 
19. The origins and development of international human rights law are the subject of a rich
scholarly literature. See, e.g., SAMUEL MOYN, NOT ENOUGH: HUMAN RIGHTS IN AN UNEQUAL
WORLD 10–11 (2018) (arguing, inter alia, for increased attention to social and economic equality
in international human rights). But even genocide was not recognized as a crime under
international law until the late 1940s. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. As for remedial secession, the keystone case did not
come until 1998. See Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, para. 138 (Can.)
(“[T]he international law right to self-determination only generates, at best, a right to external
self-determination in situations of former colonies; where a people is oppressed . . . ; or where a 
definable group is denied meaningful access to government to pursue their political, economic,
social and cultural development.”).
 20. See infra notes 57–83 and accompanying text.
21. For a sampling of scholarship making these and related points, and pressing on the 
potential weaknesses of our theory, see generally John F. Coyle, Friendly and Hostile Deals in the
Market for Sovereign Control: A Response to Professors Blocher and Gulati, 66 DUKE L.J.
ONLINE 37 (2017); Anna Gelpern, Cinderella Sovereignty, 67 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 65 (2017); Karen 
Knop, A Market for Sovereignty? The Roles of Other States in Self-Determination, 54 OSGOODE 
HALL L.J. 491 (2017); W. Mark C. Weidemaier, A (Very Thin) Market for Sovereign Control, 66 
DUKE L.J. ONLINE 67 (2017).
 22. See supra note 19 (noting developments in international law forbidding genocide and
acknowledging the possibility of remedial secession). 
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2020] TRANSFERABLE SOVEREIGNTY 1225
practice in many ways still treat sovereign control as a thing that can be 
traded. The world map is largely a product of sovereign sales—most of
the United States was purchased from other sovereign nations, after 
all23—and nations continue to negotiate with one another, as well as 
with nonstate actors, about where and how that control will be 
exercised.24 Even as this Article was being written, President Trump 
caused a stir by floating the idea of purchasing Greenland25—an
example that we will return to later in the piece.26 These transfers 
prompt questions about the relationship between property and
sovereignty,27 questions that were key to the story of the Congo in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when the concepts of 
property and sovereignty became intertwined both in theory and in
brutal practice.28 
Such purchases can be and have been exploitative or otherwise
undesirable; Leopold’s acquisition of sovereign control in the 1880s is 
a cautionary tale in that regard. That raises hard questions, which are
foundational to our understanding of states, governance, and the 
international order: Who can hold the power of sovereign control? 
How can that power be transferred? With conquest and discovery no
longer viable means of acquiring sovereign territory, what about 
voluntary transactions? If the latter, who must give their approval— 
the governments or the governed?
The story of the Congo illustrates both the stakes and the 
difficulties of these conceptual questions. In less than a century, it saw 
23. Joseph Blocher, Selling State Borders, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 241, 245–46 (2014). This does
not include purchases (and “purchases”) from Native Americans.
 24. See infra notes 280–86 and accompanying text. 
25. Greenland: Trump Warned That Island Cannot Be Bought from Denmark, BBC NEWS
(Aug. 16, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-49367792 [https://perma.cc/2P5U-
VS7P].
 26. See infra Part II.C. 
27. The classic reference is Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 
(1927). For a recent discussion, see generally 18 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. (2017) (compiling 
papers presented at a conference on “Sovereignty and Property,” held in 2015 at Columbia Law
School, and including contributions by Eyal Benvenisti, Jean L. Cohen, Hanoch Dagan & Avihay
Dorfman, Sergio Dellavalle, Larissa Katz, Martti Koskenniemi, Thomas W. Merrill, Katharina
Pistor, Arthur Ripstein, Joseph William Singer, Laura S. Underkuffler, and Jeremy Waldron).
 28. See MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870–1960, at 155–56 (2002) (referring to the Congo Free State as
“[p]erhaps the most striking effort to create European sovereignty—and the greatest
disappointment about the civilizing mission”); CARL SCHMITT, THE NOMOS OF THE EARTH IN 
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE JUS PUBLICUM EUROPAEUM 214–26 (G. L. Ulmen trans.,
Telos Press Publishing 2006) (1950) (using the Congo Free State to illustrate the disintegration of
a spatial legal order).
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1226 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1219
three transfers of sovereign control, each of which had market-like 
elements. First was Leopold’s personal acquisition of sovereign control 
in the Congo Free State.29 His abuse of that control led directly to the 
forced sale to Belgium, inaugurating decades of colonial rule.30 The
third transfer came in 1960, when the Congolese demanded and 
received independence, which came at a steep price.31 Part I explores
each of these transfers; Part II addresses some of the conceptual and 
practical benefits and challenges of transferable sovereignty. 
The story begins in Brussels, in the late nineteenth century. 
I. THE CASE STUDY: CONGO FREE STATE
A. Transfer 1: Leopold Buys Sovereign Control (1885) 
While other European nations scrambled to acquire and maintain
empires throughout the 1800s, Belgium was generally unenthusiastic 
about the colonial enterprise.32 The Belgian royal family, however, saw 
things differently. Leopold I, father of Leopold II (“Leopold,” 
hereafter), took up colonial ambitions even as he disparaged the son 
who would later achieve them.33 Conquest by the Belgian army was not 
an option, so Leopold I’s preferred mechanism of acquisition was 
purchase. He had plenty of models in that regard, both in Europe and
29. See infra Part I.A.
 30. See infra Part I.B.
 31. See infra Part I.C.
 32. MARTIN EWANS, EUROPEAN ATROCITY, AFRICAN CATASTROPHE: LEOPOLD II, THE 
CONGO FREE STATE AND ITS AFTERMATH 15 (2002). Belgium remained generally indifferent— 
albeit somewhat surprised—when Leopold’s acquisition of the Congo became known decades
later. Id. at 103. Some argued that the nation developed the taste, though, and that by 1906,
Belgium was “not merely willing, but eager to acquire the inheritance that the King had obtained
and fostered for her.” DEMETRIUS C. BOULGER, 2 THE REIGN OF LEOPOLD II: KING OF THE
BELGIANS AND FOUNDER OF THE CONGO STATE 1865–1909, at 171 (1925). Boulger’s two-
volume biography of Leopold shades into hagiography and might not be a reliable source on the 
matter, but the eminent Belgian historian Jean Stengers reached a similar conclusion, so it should
not be dismissed out of hand. See, e.g., Jean Stengers, King Leopold’s Imperialism, in STUDIES IN
THE THEORY OF IMPERIALISM 248, 262 (Roger Owen & Bob Sutcliffe eds., 1981) (“As the years
passed, he did succeed in rallying the support of an increasing number of his countrymen,
especially for his work in the Congo; and in some cases this support even became tinged with
enthusiasm.”); see also JESSE SIDDALL REEVES, THE INTERNATIONAL BEGINNINGS OF THE
CONGO FREE STATE 71 (Herbert B. Adams ed., Baltimore, John Hopkins Press 1894) (asserting 
that “many Belgians” had a desire for “colonial enterprises,” and also—improbably—that “[t]he
motives of King Leopold were evidently of a scientific and philanthropic nature”).
 33. THOMAS PAKENHAM, THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA: 1876 TO 1912, at 13 (1991); see also
NEAL ASCHERSON, THE KING INCORPORATED: LEOPOLD II IN THE AGE OF TRUSTS 29 (1964)
(noting that Leopold I “did not like [Leopold II] particularly”).
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farther afield. After all, it had only been a few decades since Thomas 
Jefferson’s administration consummated the Louisiana Purchase, more 
than doubling the size of the United States and effectively 
guaranteeing its future as a geopolitical power.34 
But Jefferson’s purchase had been accomplished through the
organs of the state, and the Belgian Parliament had little interest in 
paying for its king’s colonial speculation—a theme that would continue 
for decades, culminating ironically in the expensive purchase of the
Congo in 1908. Still, Leopold I had options. States were not the only 
entities buying up sovereign territory at the time; some nominally
private entities were acquiring territory and behaving a lot like
sovereigns. Most well known was the British East India Company,
which had been chartered by Queen Elizabeth in 1600 as a trade
company but ended up exercising quasi-sovereign powers.35 Until 1858, 
as Leopold I’s reign was coming to an end, the East India Company 
exercised sovereign control over most of the Indian subcontinent.36 
Pursuing a similar model,37 and without his country’s support, 
Leopold I “turned to private enterprise,” establishing a failure of a
colony at Santo-Tomas in Guatemala, trying to buy Crete and the 
Faroe Islands, and exploring prospects as diverse as Fiji, the New 
Hebrides, and West Africa.38 He even tried to buy part of Texas,39 
which the United States had recently purchased as part of the spoils of 
the Mexican–American War.40 He wrote, “I am specially interested in 
the Argentine Province of Entre Rios and the very small island of 
34. See generally  JON KUKLA, A WILDERNESS SO IMMENSE: THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE 
AND THE DESTINY OF AMERICA (2003). 
35. See  PHILIP J. STERN, THE COMPANY-STATE: CORPORATE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE 
EARLY MODERN FOUNDATIONS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE IN INDIA 47–60 (2011) (describing
state-like powers exercised by the East India Company in the seventeenth century, including
issuance of passports, assertions of exclusive jurisdiction, and policing); see also M. F. LINDLEY,
THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 94
(1926) (“[W]hat was at first a mere trading Corporation came in the course of time to exercise
sovereign rights over an immense area which afterwards passed under the direct administration
of the British Crown.”). For further discussion of corporate sovereignty, see generally JOSHUA 
BARKAN, CORPORATE SOVEREIGNTY: LAW AND GOVERNMENT UNDER CAPITALISM (2013).
 36. See sources cited supra note 35.
 37. See STEVEN PRESS, ROGUE EMPIRES: CONTRACTS AND CONMEN IN EUROPE’S 
SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA 81 (2017).
 38. EWANS, supra note 32, at 15; HOCHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 38 (“He asked an aide to try 
to acquire Fiji, because one should not ‘let such fine prey escape’”).  
39. Id. 
40. See Treaty with Mexico, Mex.-U.S., art. I, Dec. 30, 1853, 10 Stat. 1031, 1032 (detailing the
land to be ceded to the United States by Mexico).
BLOCHER & GULATI IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/2020 7:11 PM         
   
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
     
  
   
 
  
   
     
    
  
    
 
 
 
 
    
   
  
   
 
   
 
       
 
1228 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1219
Martin Garcia at the confluence of the Uruguay and the Parana. Who
owns this island? Could one buy it, and establish there a free port under 
the moral protection of the King of the Belgians?”41 
None of these ventures panned out, so when Leopold II, denied
his father’s affection but inheriting his ambitions, ascended to the 
throne in 1865, he bemoaned, “Petit pays, petits gens”—small country,
small people.42 Stuck in a miserable arranged marriage and increasingly
estranged from his own children,43 he directed his attention to the
project of empire-building. 
From the beginning, Leopold was focused on economic gain.44 
Drawing on the model of the East India Company, he sought by his
own account “to create an international company with its seat in 
Brussels which would become for China what the East India Company 
has become for the immense Indian Empire.”45 As one historian notes, 
“[e]ven before assuming the throne, he had cast a wistful glance at 
Dutch Limburg, Constantinople, Borneo, Sumatra, Formosa (Taiwan),
Tonkin (Vietnam), parts of China or Japan, the Philippines, a few 
islands in the Pacific or, if need be, a few islands in the 
Mediterranean.”46 
41. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 38. It would have taken a long time answer Leopold’s 
question: not until 1973 did the Treaty of Río de la Plata formally resolve ownership of the island
as between Uruguay and Argentina, and legal disputes persist even decades later. See generally 
Lilian Del CastilloLaBorde, Legal Regime of the Río De La Plata, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 251 
(1996). 
42. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 36; see also PAKENHAM, supra note 33, at 13 (noting that 
he had a paperweight inscribed “Il faut à la Belgique une colonie”—Belgium needs a colony). 
43. He would later go to extraordinary lengths to deny his daughters the proceeds of his 
estate, EWANS, supra note 32, at 231–32, and to transfer his Congolese riches to the former
prostitute he married on his deathbed, Robert Harms, King Leopold’s Bonds, in THE ORIGINS
OF VALUE: THE FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS THAT CREATED MODERN CAPITAL MARKETS 343,
357 (William N. Goetzmann & K. Geert Rouwenhorst eds., 2005) [hereinafter Harms, King
Leopold’s Bonds] (noting that Leopold married his mistress, while wearing a dressing gown, the 
night before the surgery that killed him; his “last financial transaction was the transfer of those
Congo Independent State bonds” to her).
 44. EWANS, supra note 32, at 17; PRESS, supra note 37, at 84. To the degree that patriotism
was also a motivation, it seems only incidental, though there is some room for debate. See DAVID 
VAN REYBROUCK, CONGO: THE EPIC HISTORY OF A PEOPLE 39 (Sam Garrett trans., Harper
Collins Publishers 2014) (2010) (“Fully in tune with his times, the young king effortlessly
reconciled warm-blooded patriotism with coolly calculating commercialism.”). But see id. at 61
(“His imperialism was based on decidedly economic motives.”). 
45. EWANS, supra note 32, at 19; see also PRESS, supra note 37, at 85 (discussing negotiations
to set up a commercial company in Borneo). 
46. VAN  REYBROUCK, supra note 44, at 39; see also 1 BOULGER, supra note 32, at 126
(“Various schemes were considered, and there was some talk of purchasing the Philippines from
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But the Belgian Parliament still had not warmed to the idea of a 
colony.47 And so, like his father, Leopold sought to buy an empire on 
his own. One failed start was an effort to purchase Sarawak, the
northern half of Borneo, then owned as something of a personal state 
by the Englishman James Brooke.48 Historian Steven Press explains 
that “Leopold . . . liked the idea that one man had acquired absolute,
uncontested powers of ownership over tens of thousands of human
beings—quite a contrast to Belgium, where government bureaucracy
moved slowly, and where parliament had circumscribed the king’s 
powers in diplomacy.”49 
The deal to purchase Sarawak did not work out, in part because 
Brooke did not trust Leopold’s motives vis-à-vis the native 
population.50 But, Press notes, “Leopold had learned something else
from Brooke: The idea of buying control of a country ‘out and out as a 
property’ was not necessarily outrageous.”51 He was determined to set 
up a company that could make such a purchase under the “sovereignty 
of the King of the Belgians.”52 But where would he find the territory?
And what would it take to acquire it? 
Leopold was not alone in this pursuit of empire. In fact, the 
ambitions of the other colonial powers were partly why he had such a 
hard time finding a suitable seller in the market for sovereignty. Every
continent but Africa was already effectively occupied by European
powers,53 especially the French, British, and Germans,54 but also the
Spanish and Portuguese.55 The Italians had not entirely given up on this 
endeavor either, though Ethiopia’s King Menelik II had dealt their 
Spain, or an African colony from Portugal. . . . A concession in China, or, still better, a base in
Formosa or some other island off the cost of China, appealed to his judgment and imagination.”).
 47. See 1 BOULGER, supra note 32, at 33 (“[T]he national character, or perhaps it would be
more correct to say the national experiences, rendered the Belgian people averse to any policy of
adventure outside their borders.”). 
48. See LINDLEY, supra note 35, at 87–88 (describing Brooke’s ownership). 
49. PRESS, supra note 37, at 86.  
50. Id. at 85–86.
 51. Id. at 87 (quoting Letter from James Brooke to Brooke (Aug. 26, 1862)). Later, “his
apologists cited the British North Borneo Company, to which, as recently as 1881, the Sultan of
Brunei had conceded such rights over a wide area.” EWANS, supra note 32, at 78. 
52. PRESS, supra note 37, at 87 (quoting Memorandum from Leopold II (May 1873)). 
53. See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 61.
 54. See REEVES, supra note 32, at 27 (“It has been said of the three great powers of western 
Europe, ‘that France has colonies but no colonists, Germany has colonists but no colonies, and
that England alone has both.’”). 
55. See id. at 7.
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imperial ambitions a serious blow.56 The dwindling supply of feasible 
colonies, compounded by the colonial powers’ pent-up demand in the 
market for sovereignty, partially explains the intensity of the
“Scramble for Africa” at the end of the century.
But what would it mean for Leopold—or any colonial state—to 
acquire a colony? Was it like buying a piece of property57 or like 
extending sovereign control over a country? There was not then, nor is 
there now, a clear dividing line between the two concepts of property 
and sovereignty58—scholars continue to debate whether property
precedes or is produced by sovereignty, or whether it is simply a species 
thereof. But as a matter of rhetoric and emphasis, the notion that 
populated territory was essentially a type of governmental property
was certainly much more prominent and influential in Leopold’s time 
than it is now.59 
On this view, establishing sovereign control was analogous to 
acquiring property and could be accomplished in a similar manner.60 
The Lockean Proviso, which still animates a great deal of property
theory, held that a person encountering an unowned resource can
establish ownership by mixing his labor with it and leaving enough and 
as good for others.61 Locke heavily influenced the Framers of the U.S. 
Constitution,62 and the U.S. government employed strains of his labor-
56. Menelik defeated the Italians at the battle of Adwa; Ethiopia was one of the few African 
nations to retain its independence. For a thorough account of the battle and its broader context,
see generally RAYMOND JONAS, THE BATTLE OF ADWA: AFRICAN VICTORY IN THE AGE OF
EMPIRE (2011).
 57. Cf. E. D. Morel, The Congo Cession: What the New Treaty Means, MANCHESTER 
GUARDIAN, Dec. 17, 1907, at 6 (describing the “assets” of the Congo, including that “[t]he
principal items are what might be described as the State’s ‘fixtures’”). 
58. See supra note 27 for classic and contemporary investigations of the distinction between
property and sovereignty.
59. As the story in this Article suggests, and as we have argued elsewhere, we think that
there is nonetheless some value that can be redeemed from the property-like vision of
sovereignty. See, e.g., Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, Markets and Sovereignty, 54 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 465 (2017).
60. One common challenge was defining how much control suffices to establish a legal
claim—a question familiar to students of property. See, e.g., Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y.
1805). At the Berlin Conference, which effectively carved up the continent among the European
powers, “[m]uch of the drafting process was constituted of the watering down of the duties of the
colonizing power”—lessening the degree of authority necessary to establish sovereign control.
KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 28, at 126. 
61. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 329 (rev. ed., Cambridge University
Press 1965) (1690).
62. Locke was the third most cited thinker of the Founding era, after Montesquieu and
Blackstone. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE
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2020] TRANSFERABLE SOVEREIGNTY 1231
based theory to help justify the partial displacement of Native 
American claims to both property and sovereignty.63 
These same themes of property and sovereignty are intertwined 
with the colonial experience in Africa. In the late 1800s, indigenous 
rulers held 80 percent of the African continent,64 though Europeans 
were somewhat disinclined to respect their claims. The set of “civilized 
nations” whose boundaries and territorial sovereignty had to be
respected were the white Christian ones, and by 1894, these nations 
had almost finished carving up the interior of the continent for
themselves.65 This made it possible for the European powers to cast the
annexation of African territory as something like exploration, rather 
than violent conquest. 
When the Portuguese explorer Diogo Cão reached the mouth of 
the Congo River in 1482, he erected a limestone pillar announcing that
“King João II of Portugal did order this land to be discovered and this 
pillar of stone to be erected by Diogo Cão, an esquire in his 
household.”66 Four centuries later, ironically on the same day in 1885 
that the Congo Free State was officially proclaimed to exist, a royal 
decree from Brussels announced that all “vacant land” in the Congo
was the property of Belgium.67 “Vacant” was interpreted broadly, so 
PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 8 (2012) (citing DONALD S. LUTZ, A PREFACE TO
AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORY 134–40 (1992)). 
63. We say “partial” because Native Americans still possess a complex kind of sovereignty
within the U.S. system, and because their rights to property—though limited—were never fully
extinguished. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823) (invoking the theory
of property acquisition by “discovery” while claiming to recognize that “the rights of the original
inhabitants were, in no instance, entirely disregarded”). Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in
M’Intosh also suggested, in keeping with Locke, that the Native Americans were not, in fact,
mixing their labor with the land in such a way as would justify a full property claim. Id. at 590
(“To leave them in possession of their country, was to leave the country a wilderness . . . .”). 
For analysis of the intertwined theories of property and imperialism animating Chief
Justice Marshall’s opinion in M’Intosh, see generally Jedediah Purdy, Property and Empire: The
Law of Imperialism in Johnson v. M’Intosh, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 329 (2007), and see id. at 336 
n.36 (“[T]he defendants in Johnson, arguing against Native American title, marshaled a set of
arguments that had been designed precisely to justify colonial expropriation, specifically the
accounts of property and sovereignty developed by Grotius, Locke, and Vattel.”).
 64. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 42. 
65. See REEVES, supra note 32, at 7 (noting that European powers such as France, Portugal,
England, Spain, and Germany had largely portioned out the African continent by 1894).
 66. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 8.
 67. Id. at 117; see also EWANS, supra note 32, at 158 (noting that even though it “had been a 
practice, both in Africa and elsewhere, for colonial powers to declare ‘unoccupied’ land the
property of the government, the extent to which this affected the inhabitants varied, and nowhere 
were the restrictions on exploitation so far-reaching as those which were now put into effect in
the Congo”); PRESS, supra note 37, at 212 (“Fittingly, the most significant of [Congo Free State
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that Belgium claimed a great deal of land, natives notwithstanding,68 
and quickly leased it out as concessions to private companies 
controlled largely by Belgians.69 Nearly a century earlier, Locke had 
written, “In the beginning all the World was America.”70 Now, only 
Africa was.
It is no surprise, then, that many of the major players in the 
Scramble for Africa were known primarily as explorers. For years, 
Leopold’s main emissary on the continent and the international stage 
was Henry Morton Stanley, already made famous by his possibly 
apocryphal greeting, “Dr. Livingstone, I presume?”71 Stanley’s charge
was not simply to explore, map, and build in the Congo, but to buy it. 
The king wrote to him: 
It is indispensable you should purchase . . . as much land as you will 
be able to obtain, and that you should place successively under . . .
suzerainty . . . as soon as possible and without losing one minute, all
the chiefs from the mouth of the Congo to the Stanley Falls. . . . If you 
let me know you are going to execute these instructions without delay 
I will send you more people and more material. Perhaps Chinese 
coolies.72 
The relationship between property and sovereignty was central in
these exchanges, and along with it some friction between Stanley and 
the king. Stanley did not entirely trust Leopold’s supposedly 
humanitarian mission—namely, to bring civilization to the Congo and 
eradicate the slave trade73—and he did not always move as aggressively 
as the king wanted.
Significantly, Stanley—like Pierre de Brazza and others of his 
ilk—sought to accomplish these acquisitions by treaty. Across the
continent, European nations obtained “sovereignty” through what
Administrator General Francis] de Winton’s early acts had nothing to do with courts or welfare:
It was to annul all preexisting contracts in the Congo Basin and to convert allegedly ‘vacant’ or
‘undeveloped’ lands into public—that is association—property.”).
 68. VAN REYBROUCK, supra note 44, at 79 (“At one fell swoop the king nationalized some
99 percent of the country.”). 
69. See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 117. 
70. Herman Lebovics, The Uses of America in Locke’s Second Treatise of Government, 47
J. HIST. IDEAS 567, 567 (1986).
71. For a thorough examination of the phrase, its afterlife, and broader themes of
imperialism, see generally CLARE PETTITT, DR. LIVINGSTONE, I PRESUME? MISSIONARIES,
JOURNALISTS, EXPLORERS, AND EMPIRE (2007).
 72. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 70 (omissions in original).
 73. PRESS, supra note 37, at 97.
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2020] TRANSFERABLE SOVEREIGNTY 1233
Thomas Pakenham calls an “orgy of treaty-making.”74 Hundreds of 
treaties were written,75 covering an incalculable amount of territory
and people. In concluding them, the colonial powers were trying to 
create what Martti Koskenniemi calls an “irreproachable moral-legal
basis for European title” that would distinguish them from the
fifteenth- and sixteenth-century empires of conquest.76 The thought
was that this more civilized approach—colonialism by consent—might
replace the Lockean façade.
As early as 1884, Stanley had concluded more than 300 treaties 
with natives in the Congo,77 though Leopold still complained that 
Stanley was moving too slowly78 and generously. At one point, the king 
expressed displeasure at Stanley’s apparent belief that African chiefs 
should be able to retain sovereignty over their land, even as private
companies plundered their property. He wrote: 
The terms of the treaties Stanley has made with the native chiefs do
not satisfy me. There must at least be added an article to the effect that 
they delegate to us their sovereign rights over the territories which are 
the subject of the said conventions . . . The treaties must be as brief as 
possible and in a couple of articles must grant us everything.79 
But what was “everything”? Many of the treaties—and some of 
Leopold’s missives to Stanley—referred to “suzerainty” rather than 
“sovereignty.”80 It was unclear what either term exactly meant, let 
alone whether they are equivalent.81 It has been said that the Africans
did not know what they were selling;82 it could also be said that the 
Europeans did not entirely know what they were buying.83 
74. PAKENHAM, supra note 33, at 291.
 75. PRESS, supra note 37, at 1.
 76. KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 28, at 138.
 77. REEVES, supra note 32, at 20.
 78. ASCHERSON, supra note 33, at 114.
 79. EWANS, supra note 32, at 71 (omissions in original) (emphasis added); see also  VAN
REYBROUCK, supra note 44, at 50–51 (providing a slightly different translation). 
80. PRESS, supra note 37, at 125.
 81. See id. (“‘Suzerainty’ as ceded to the foreign agents would not give Leopold’s association
any control over the land itself; it would merely give it the title and duties of a protector.”).
 82. VAN REYBROUCK, supra note 44, at 51 (“[E]ven if they had been able to read the texts,
they would not have been familiar with concepts of European property and constitutional law like 
‘sovereignty,’ ‘exclusivity,’ and ‘perpetuity.’”).
 83. PRESS, supra note 37, at 108–09 (noting confusion over Pierre de Brazza’s contracts with
a king in the Congo; “[t]he most important of them, complained the American ambassador to
Paris, was ‘drawn up in such language’ that it was ‘not easy to understand exactly its meaning’”
(quoting GRAHAM SAUNDERS, A HISTORY OF BRUNEI 83 (1994)); id. at 110 (“European treaty
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These treaties raised questions not only of what sovereignty 
entailed and how it could be transferred, but also who could possess it,
and specifically whether sovereignty could be held by a nonstate actor. 
The Congo Free State was not the only place where those questions 
were relevant. In fact, chartered company governments owned roughly 
three-quarters of British territory acquired in sub-Saharan Africa after 
1880.84 
Such territories are the focus of Steven Press’s recent book, Rogue 
Empires. Press’s goal is to “examine[] the global confusion over 
sovereignty wrought by the Independent State of the Congo and a host 
of related political forms” and to show how the Scramble for Africa
“was a race, not necessarily to conquer or take land by force—most of
that came later, starting in the 1890s—but to claim treaties, or paper 
deeds, which nominally sold to Europeans the titles to govern various 
territories.”85 Press documents how a market for sovereign territory
emerged at the end of the nineteenth century, and how that market 
included not only existing states but also individuals like Leopold and 
corporate entities like the East India Company.86 
Even before it brought suffering to the Congolese, King Leopold’s 
control of the Congo Free State presented a foundational challenge for 
international law. Beginning with the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, the 
building block of the international order was the sovereign state.87 
Despite the existence of pseudosovereigns like the East India 
Company, and states’ recognized role in protecting their citizens and
investors abroad,88 some perceived the exercise of sovereignty by
nonstate actors as anomalous and threatening to the world order.  
negotiators, who ordinarily dealt with kings or emirs in other, non-Christian parts of the world,
frequently misread the powers of such men as Iloo in Sub-Saharan Africa.”).
 84. Id. at 219 (citing Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann, The Purpose of German Colonialism, 
or the Long Shadow of Bismarck’s Colonial Policy, in GERMAN COLONIALISM: RACE, THE
HOLOCAUST, AND POSTWAR GERMANY 193, 202 (Volker Langbehn & Mohammad Salama eds., 
2011)).
 85. Id. at 4; see also Edward Keene, The Treaty-Making Revolution of the Nineteenth
Century, 34 INT’L HIST. REV. 475, 491 (2012) (noting that the increase in treaty-making by the
European powers in the 1880s was primarily due to treaties dealing with matters outside Europe).
 86. Id. at 6.
87. Jan Aart Scholte, The Globalization of World Politics, in  THE GLOBALIZATION OF
WORLD POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 13, 20 (John Baylis &
Steve Smith eds., 2d ed. 2001).
 88. PRESS, supra note 37, at 65 (“The court at Madrid had insisted since the days of Hernán
Cortés that European powers must hold sovereignty over any provinces acquired by
conquistadores overseas.”). Leopold was keenly aware of this precedent, and in fact his ambitions
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American scholar Jesse Siddall Reeves echoed an unnamed 
diplomat’s description of the Congo Free State as a “monstrosity.”89 
John Westlake, perhaps the most prominent British scholar of 
international law at the time, bemoaned “adventurers . . . who in recent 
times have led the way to the partition of Africa, [and who] have had a
sufficient tincture of the forms and language of international law to 
hope for an advantage over European competitors, through what have 
really been travesties of them.”90 Westlake argued that sovereignty 
itself was strictly a European concept and that African chiefs had no 
power to transfer it.91 
But others resolved this difficulty in the other direction, arguing 
that entities like the Congo Free State must be recognized as 
sovereigns in their own right precisely because they could not be
privately owned. Émile de Laveleye—an expert on the history of 
property—suggested that Leopold’s nominally philanthropic 
association, formed for the purpose of acquiring the Congo, “must 
become a state because Belgium did not own, and would not buy, the 
association’s sovereign rights.”92 Égide Arntz, secretary general of the
Institute of International Law in Geneva, challenged Leopold’s critics 
to show a rule against such private ownership of sovereignty.93 
Although the evidence indicates that Leopold’s primary goals 
were economic all along, he and his proxies insisted that he was 
motivated by humanitarian goals like the elimination of the slave trade
instead.94 Leopold hired some of the most eminent scholars of the day 
in China were largely guided by the idea that, in Stengers’s words, “concessions for mines and
railways would serve as a stepping-stone to territorial control.” Stengers, supra note 32, at 256.
 89. REEVES, supra note 32, at 74 (quoting an unnamed diplomat).
 90. PRESS, supra note 37, at 237 (quoting JOHN WESTLAKE, CHAPTERS ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW, reprinted in THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF JOHN WESTLAKE ON PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 153 (L. Oppenheim ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1914)).
 91. KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 28, at 127 (citing J. Westlake, Le Conflit Anglo-Portugais, 18
REVUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL ET DE LÉGISLATION COMPARÉE 247–48 (Brussels, 1891)).
George Washington Williams and Roger Casement, among others, expressed similar views. JOHN
HOPE FRANKLIN, GEORGE WASHINGTON WILLIAMS: A BIOGRAPHY 217 (Duke Univ. Press
1998) (1985). 
92. PRESS, supra note 37, at 235.
 93. Id.
 94. GUY VANTHEMSCHE, BELGIUM AND THE CONGO 1885–1980, at 19 (Alice Cameron &
Stephen Windross trans., 2012). Historian Guy Vanthemsche writes:
For the king, the fight against slavery was nothing more than a blind aimed at hiding
his material ambitions. Leopold’s anti-slavery campaigns were simply a means of
establishing trade and political domination in the heart of Africa. It is true that . . . the
traditional slave trade was eliminated, but the Congo Free State authorities
immediately introduced other forms of coercion and forced labour.
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to help translate that dubious claim into a rationale for sovereign 
control of the Free State by arguing that private individuals and entities 
can and should be vested with sovereign rights.95 
Leopold’s most significant scholarly defender was Sir Travers 
Twiss, an Oxford professor who later occupied Arntz’s position as 
secretary general in Geneva and who drafted the constitution of the
Congo Free State.96 Twiss had been laid low by personal scandal 
involving his wife Marie, who he had presented in society as a Polish
aristocrat but was discovered to be a French prostitute.97 Incidentally, 
just before his death, Leopold was involved in a similar scandal, 
transferring an immense amount of his Congo-earned wealth to his 
mistress, Caroline, who after his death went on to marry the pimp who
had introduced her to the king.98 
Roughly a decade after the scandal that forced Twiss to leave high
society and its associated incomes, he contacted Leopold with a
proposal. Twiss’s initial pitch to Leopold regarding international law 
reform was, on its face, progressive. Twiss wanted “Oriental[s]” to be
given an equal place in international law.99 The trick was that this 
would help support claims by private parties such as Leopold that they 
had legitimately contracted to purchase sovereign control from tribes
in Africa. This was a position that Twiss himself, along with eminent 
scholars such as Emer de Vattel, had opposed in prior work.100 But
Twiss was in desperate need of both financial support and a means to
get back into the elite international law arena. The end result: Twiss 
wrote reports supporting the right of private actors to act as sovereigns 
when entering into treaties with natives.101 
Id. at 22. 
95. KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 28, at 143.
 96. Id. at 33, 108. Arntz and Twiss’s expert statements were presented to the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations in 1884, prior to the U.S. recognition of the Congo Free State.
Id. at 122–23.  
97. On Twiss and the scandal, see Andrew Fitzmaurice, The Expansion of International
Franchise in the Late Nineteenth Century, 28 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L. L. 449, 451–57 (2018); and
Twiss, Sir Travers, 27 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 493 (Hugh Chisolm ed., 11th ed. 1911).  
98. As Hochschild notes dryly, “If she shared some of her fortune with him, his was surely
one of the most successful feats of pimpery of all time.” HOCHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 266. For
Caroline’s own telling of the story, see BARONESS DE VAUGHAN, A COMMONER MARRIED A
KING (1937).
 99. Fitzmaurice, supra note 97, at 458–59. 
100. Id. at 459.
 101. See, e.g., Travers Twiss, An International Protectorate of the Congo River, 250 L. MAG.
& REV. 1, 15 (1883) (discussing the benefits of personal sovereignty as quelling unrest). 
BLOCHER & GULATI IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/2020 7:11 PM         
  
 
 
 
   
  
    
  
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
   
  
 
  
    
 
  
   
 
   
    
  
  
    
 
    
2020] TRANSFERABLE SOVEREIGNTY 1237
Press argues that for legal scholars like Twiss, “discussions 
centering on ethics missed the point. What really mattered was that 
everyone legally could participate in a worldwide market for 
sovereignty, be they monarchs, entrepreneurs, or missionaries.”102 By 
dramatically increasing the range of possible buyers of sovereignty— 
and, therefore, later sellers—Leopold and his cronies had significantly
expanded the possibility of participation in the market for sovereignty. 
Still, sovereign control itself could only be traded after it had been 
legitimized by the international community.  
In 1884, after the American recognition of Leopold’s new nation, 
the major colonial powers met in Berlin to resolve the borders of their 
African claims.103 It was at the Berlin Conference that Leopold’s claim 
to the Congo was formally recognized—its sovereignty, under his 
leadership, achieved.104 British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury
described the bizarre nature of these negotiations and transfers:  
We have been engaged . . . in drawing lines upon maps where no white 
man’s feet have ever trod; we have been giving away mountains and
rivers and lakes to each other, but we have only been hindered by the 
small impediment that we never knew exactly where those mountains
and rivers and lakes were.105 
It hardly needs mentioning that no Africans participated in the
discussions.106 
102. PRESS, supra note 37, at 235 (footnote omitted) (“Other famous professors, each hired
by Leopold, supported the proposition by claiming the world was a marketplace for
sovereignty.”).
103. Koskenniemi describes the Conference as “a multilateral attempt to channel the
scramble in Africa into pacific channels.” KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 28, at 123. Press similarly 
noted:  
[T]he conference only addressed certain parts of Africa, and its official agenda did not 
so much authorize new colonization as approve colonization that had already gotten
underway. . . . Those who believe its resolutions carried out the partition of Africa
surely exaggerate. But those who dismiss it as meaningless also go too far.
PRESS, supra note 37, at 195 (footnote omitted). See also RUTH SLADE, KING LEOPOLD’S CONGO:
ASPECTS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF RACE RELATIONS IN THE CONGO INDEPENDENT STATE 41 
(1962) [hereinafter SLADE, KING LEOPOLD’S CONGO] (arguing that the Conference was
animated by the belief that “European Powers had the right to annex African territory for their
own advantage”).
104. Whether Berlin created or simply recognized the Congo Free State is a matter of debate.
See 1 BOULGER, supra note 32, at 160 (“It is . . . quite erroneous to state that the Congo State was
the creation of the Berlin Conference . . . .”).
105. Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment, 1994 I.C.J. 6, 53 (Feb. 3)
(separate opinion by Ajibola, J.) (alteration in original) (quoting Lord Salisbury, Memorial of
Libya (1890)). 
106. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 84.
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Leopold had long expressed his determination to get “a slice of
this magnificent African cake.”107 Now he had it. As one prominent 
Belgian historian put it, he owned the colony in the way that John 
Rockefeller owned Standard Oil.108 Never was there a suggestion that 
Belgium itself would govern the Congo as a sovereign territory. In fact, 
by the terms of the Belgian constitution, Parliament had to specifically 
approve Leopold becoming king of another state.109 That said, once
other nations had recognized Leopold’s claim, Belgium itself had little 
choice but to do the same,110 and ultimately Parliament’s agreement 
was procured through a promise from Leopold that the colony would
never be a financial drain on the Belgian state.111 It would be only a few 
years before this promise was broken.  
B. Transfer 2: Belgium Buys the Congo Free State (1908)
Edmund Dene Morel was not the kind of person one might expect 
to ignite what has been called one of the world’s first international
human rights movements.112 He began his career as a shipping clerk, 
not a fire-breathing reformer.113 But it was his training and instincts as
a clerk that revealed the scale of the exploitation in the Congo Free
State to him. While observing the port in Antwerp, Morel marveled at 
the volume of rubber, ivory, and other goods brought in from Africa
… and that the boats left Europe empty.114 This suggested pillage, not 
trade. It was a Sherlock Holmes moment—a dog that did not bark.115 
107. Id. at 58. The invocation of appetite is appropriate; Leopold regularly consumed half a 
dozen eggs at breakfast as well as “a whole pot of marmalade.” ASCHERSON, supra note 33, at 
263; HOCHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 169. In keeping with the theme, Jean Stengers describes
Leopold’s “territorial voracity.” Stengers, supra note 32, at 249.
 108. SLADE, KING LEOPOLD’S CONGO, supra note 103, at 175–76 (citing Jean Stengers, La 
Place de Léopold II dans l’Histoire de la Colonisation, 9 NOUVELLE CLIO 515, 527 (1950)).
 109. EWANS, supra note 32, at 103.
 110. 1 BOULGER, supra note 32, at 161–67 (describing the reconciliation of dual roles); PRESS, 
supra note 37, at 211. Ruth Slade notes a similar point: 
Although officially we do not have to answer for the treatment meted out to the Congo
natives, our honour and the good name of Belgium are at stake if a country which is 
governed by our King and largely administered by Belgians, is not worthy of the esteem
and confidence of civilised humanity.
SLADE, KING LEOPOLD’S CONGO, supra note 103, at 203 (quoting a Belgian commentator).
 111. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 91; see also EWANS, supra note 32, at 104.
 112. See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 2.
 113. CATHERINE ANN CLINE, E.D. MOREL, 1873–1924: THE STRATEGIES OF PROTEST 67
(1980). 
114. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 2, 180. 
115. As it happens, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle would later become a close friend of Morel’s and
a leading voice in the Congo reform movement. See A. CONAN DOYLE, THE CRIME OF THE 
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As Morel said, “[i]t must be bad enough . . . to stumble upon a murder.
I had stumbled upon a secret society of murderers with a King for a
croniman.”116 
What motivated that society of murderers was, in part, a seemingly 
innocuous development: John Boyd Dunlop’s invention of the
pneumatic tire.117 Dunlop’s innovation helped precipitate an
international frenzy for rubber that simultaneously and symmetrically 
saved Leopold financially118 and spelled doom for millions of
Congolese. 
At the time, rubber was harvested from vines, of which the Congo
Free State had a great many.119 But extracting rubber from those vines 
without destroying them was backbreaking work, a task that became
harder as desperate workers chopped vines in two to collect as much
rubber as possible and ranged farther into the jungle to meet their
quotas.120 As with his early efforts to buy colonies, Leopold found that 
there was simply no price at which labor could be profitably 
CONGO (1909) (providing a powerful account of the atrocities in the Congo intended to raise
public awareness); HOCHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 180 (noting that the men became “good
friends”).
 116. PAKENHAM, supra note 33, at 591.
 117. Paul Vallely, Forever in Chains: The Tragic History of Congo, INDEPENDENT (July 28, 
2006), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/forever-in-chains-the-tragic-history-of-
congo-6232383.html [https://perma.cc/DU9V-XPKG] (“[A] Scot called Dunlop invented the
pneumatic tyre for his bicycle, and the worldwide boom in rubber began. In the Congo, wild jungle
vines that yielded the stuff grew everywhere.”).
 118. EWANS, supra note 32, at 169 (“At that point, fate intervened on Leopold’s side, with the 
mushrooming in the demand for rubber, . . . the Congo was about to become highly profitable.”);
CRAWFORD YOUNG & THOMAS TURNER, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE ZAIRIAN STATE 33 
(1985).  
119. Robert Harms, What a New Scramble Could Mean for Africans, WASH. POST (Dec. 3,
2019) [hereinafter Harms, What a New Scramble Could Mean for Africans]. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/12/03/what-new-scramble-could-mean-africans 
[https://perma.cc/M22C-SM5W].
 120. Harms, King Leopold’s Bonds, supra note 43, at 354 (“Of late the people have been
compelled to so frequently tap the vines that the latter soon dry up and die.”) (quoting a 1901
report by company agent Edgar Canisius); Harms, What a New Scramble Could Mean for Africans
(“Rubber tappers had to travel farther and farther into the forest to find vines to exploit, leading
to violent clashes and warfare between villages over the last remaining strands of rubber vines.”);
see also NELSON, supra note 15, at 84 (“Because of ignorance or unconcern, there was little 
attempt at resource conservation until 1903, when the State set requirements for replanting and
penalties for incorrect tapping procedures. But such measures were too little and too late.”). See
generally E. D. MOREL, RED RUBBER: THE STORY OF THE RUBBER SLAVE TRADE 
FLOURISHING ON THE CONGO IN THE YEAR OF GRACE 1906 (1906) (revealing the exploitation 
and brutality in Leopold’s rubber trade).
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1240 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1219
purchased.121 And so again, he set up a system that allowed him to take
what he wanted. 
To call rubber harvesting a system of forced labor is too gentle; it
was more akin to slavery.122 As an institution, slavery was not new to
the Congo—long before the arrival of the Europeans, Africans in what 
was then the Kingdom of the Kongo, owned and traded slaves.123 But
European slavers were more thorough and barbaric.124 In 1526, King
Affonso I of the Kongo wrote to Portugal’s King João III: “Each day 
the traders are kidnapping our people . . . . This corruption and
depravity are so widespread that our land is entirely depopulated.”125 
King João III responded to the claim of scarcity, not depravity; 
answering Affonso’s claim to the people, not to the people’s self-
ownership: “You . . . tell me that . . . this trade is depopulating your
country. . . . The Portuguese there, on the contrary, tell me how vast 
the Congo is, and how it is so thickly populated that it seems as if no
slave has ever left.”126 
From a legal perspective, the fundamental fact of slavery is that it 
entails one person’s ownership of another.127 The power of Leopold 
and those who abetted him was near absolute, and they achieved
submission over the Congolese by using local variants of the means 
121. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 161 (“No payments of trinkets or brass wire were enough
to make people stay in the flooded forest for days at a time to do work that was so arduous—and
physically painful.”).
 122. See, e.g., FRANKLIN, supra note 91, at 217 (“A Congolese could not sell the ivory he had
carefully hoarded. His lands were not his own. He could not dispose of his produce in the open
market. Indeed, the work of his own hands were not his.”); GEORGES NZONGOLA-NTALAJA,
THE CONGO FROM LEOPOLD TO KABILA: A PEOPLE’S HISTORY 20 (2002) (“Colonial
accumulation was based on forced labour, which took on aspects of slave labour in the [Congo
Free State], a political unit that was supposedly created as a humanitarian venture against
slavery.”); PAKENHAM, supra note 33, at 629 (“Brazza ‘saw the concessionary companies,
rapacious and cynical, trying to create a new form of slavery . . . .’”(quoting FÉLICIEN CHALLAYE,
LE CONGO FRANÇAIS (1909))). Forced labor was not limited to the rubber industry. See VAN 
REYBROUCK, supra note 44, at 62 (“Leopold had sworn to put an end to the Swahilo-Arab slave 
trade, but in essence there was no difference between the life of a Central African domestic slave 
on the Arab peninsula and a boy in the household of a European official in Congo.”). 
123. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 9–11. 
124. Id. at 10. 
125. Id. at 13. 
126. Id. at 14 (first and last omissions in original). 
127. As a famous antebellum case from the United States put it: “The power of the master
must be absolute to render the submission of the slave perfect.” State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.)
263, 266 (1829). For examinations of the role of contract and property frames in the system of
slavery, see generally AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR,
MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION (1998); SEAN WILENTZ,
NO PROPERTY IN MAN: SLAVERY AND ANTISLAVERY AT THE NATION’S FOUNDING (2018). 
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2020] TRANSFERABLE SOVEREIGNTY 1241
employed against slaves in the American South. For instance, 
Congolese were subjected to lashes from the chicotte—a whip made 
from a corkscrewed and razor-sharp strip of dried hippopotamus 
hide.128 Twenty-five lashes could render a person unconscious; one
hundred were often fatal.129 But because the rubber barons’ goal was 
primarily economic, such measures were costly from their perspective.
Bodies, especially grown male bodies, were valuable, just as they had
been to the slavers. Some therefore adopted another solution: holding 
family members hostage,130 and cutting off their hands or sometimes 
entire limbs if a laborer failed to make his quota. The pictures were,
and are, devastating.131 
In his capacity as sovereign, Leopold built government-style 
institutions to support this regime. In 1888, he created a paramilitary
police force, the Force Publique, to maintain order and punish those 
who fought against the industrial machine.132 It would remain in power 
for most of the next century, even after independence, and was 
instrumental in suppressing Congolese resistance.133 As for the
international law community, which had been so centrally engaged 
with the questions of sovereignty attending the Free State’s founding,
it had little to say as the horrors of that State came to light, especially 
in the later years.134 
But despite Leopold’s best efforts and the complicity of those who
profited, reformers began to—in the words of a poem sometimes 
displayed at Congolese protests—“flood his deeds with day” by writing
extensively about the atrocities in the Free State.135 In 1890, a black 
missionary from the United States, George Washington Williams, 
penned a remarkable open letter to King Leopold,136 and then followed 
128. NZONGOLA-NTALAJA, supra note 122, at 22.
 129. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 120.
 130. Id. at 161.
131. Twain imagined Leopold’s reaction: “Then all of a sudden came the crash! That is to say,
the incorruptible kodak – and all the harmony went to hell!! The only witness I have encountered
in my long experience that I couldn’t bribe.” TWAIN, supra note 17, at 68. 
132. EWANS, supra note 32, at 115.
 133. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 301 (noting that the Force Publique helped repress the 
independence movement in 1950s).
 134. KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 28, at 163 (noting the “indifference of international lawyers,”
and that “[a]part from the apologies by [Belgian international lawyers Ernest] Nys and [Baron
Éduoard] Descamps, the international law community stayed silent during the peak years of the
Congo controversy, 1903–1908”). 
135. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 215.
 136. FRANKLIN, supra note 91, at xxiii (detailing Williams’s trip to the Congo).
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1242 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1219
it up with a scathing report enumerating many of the Congo’s central 
problems.137 William Sheppard, another black American missionary, 
lived in the Congo for years, describing and decrying the violence of 
the rubber “trade” in increasingly strident terms.138 Roger Casement, a
British diplomat famous for his documentation of colonial abuses— 
and later for his role in Ireland’s Easter Rising, a role that would see 
him hung for treason—also wrote powerfully of the brutality in the 
Congo.139 
Leopold fought back, and those who were making money off his 
personal colony had incentives to accept his defenses. As early as the 
mid-1890s, Leopold had paid “large indemnity payments to the British 
and German governments” after the Force Publique executed an Irish 
trader, threatening the security of Europeans in the country and— 
perhaps more importantly to those other governments—the freedom
of trade in the Congo.140 
But Leopold’s efforts to buy his way out of the problem backfired.
One key misstep was the hiring—and eventual firing—of Henry
Kowalsky, a notorious lawyer and lobbyist from San Francisco.
Kowalsky was a larger-than-life figure with unsavory connections and
a predilection for drama; he was once nearly shot by a furious Wyatt 
Earp, but succumbed to a bout of narcolepsy before Earp pulled the
trigger.141 When Leopold cut off Kowalsky’s retainer, he went to the
press with messages from the king outlining his efforts to purchase U.S. 
support for his claim to sovereign control. The effect of Kowalsky’s 
report was that “Americans woke up to discover that agents of a 
foreign power had been paid to corrupt their representatives in
Congress—and had succeeded in bribing an official of the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations.”142 
The most devastating reports, though, were those coming from the 
Congo itself. In the summer of 1890, a young man named Konrad
137. Id. at 264.
 138. See generally WILLIAM E. PHIPPS, WILLIAM SHEPPARD: CONGO’S AFRICAN AMERICAN
LIVINGSTONE (2002).
 139. See BRIAN INGLIS, ROGER CASEMENT 13 (1973).
 140. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 174; Paul McStallworth, The United States and the Congo
Question, 1884–1914, at 340 (1954) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University) (on
file with the Ohio State University) (“Beyond the shadow of a doubt, [U.S.] interest and initiative 
in the Congo were in the strictest sense economic.”).
 141. Col. Kowalsky Dozed Under Bad Man’s Gun: King Leopold’s American Lobbyist
Disconcerted Wyatt Earp, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1906, at 11.
 142. PAKENHAM, supra note 33, at 659.
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2020] TRANSFERABLE SOVEREIGNTY 1243
Korzeniowski arrived in Congo, where he would remain for six 
miserable months.143 Nearly a decade later—then known as Joseph
Conrad—he shaped this experience into the acclaimed novel, Heart of
Darkness,144 which he said “pushed a little (and only very little) beyond
the actual facts of the case.”145 As the novel draws to a close, the 
narrator, Marlow, has reached his goal: a post deep in the jungle where 
the mysterious, mercurial, and powerful Mr. Kurtz is stationed. Kurtz 
has been extraordinarily successful in collecting ivory but has adopted
brutal methods, staking the heads of natives on fenceposts outside his 
home. Kurtz, who is seriously ill and has descended into madness, has 
a moment of clarity in his final lines:
Anything approaching the change that came over his features I have
never seen before, and hope never to see again. . . . He cried in a 
whisper at some image, at some vision—he cried out twice, a cry that 
was no more than a breath—“The horror! The horror!”146 
Morel, Williams, Casement, and their allies built what was one of 
the first international human rights movements of the century.147 In
doing so, they had to overcome Leopold’s secrecy and lobbying, the 
public’s general lack of knowledge, and detractors’ political opposition.
Some voices in the United States, for example, opposed intervention,
comparing Leopold’s reign to the United States’ own struggles with its 
identity as an imperial power in the wake of the Spanish–American
War. In February 1906, Secretary of State Elihu Root actually
expressed sympathy for Leopold’s difficulties, analogizing the Congo 
to the Philippines, which the United States had recently acquired from 
Spain.148 In a series of prominent Chicago Tribune articles collectively
143. JEFFREY MEYERS, JOSEPH CONRAD: A BIOGRAPHY 102–08 (1991) (describing Conrad’s 
arrival in June and departure in December of that year.)
 144. JOSEPH CONRAD, HEART OF DARKNESS (Alfred A. Knopf 1993) (1902). 
145. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 143; see also CHINUA ACHEBE, HOPES AND
IMPEDIMENTS: SELECTED ESSAYS 1965–1987, at 2 (1988) (noting the racism implicit in Heart of 
Darkness). 
146. CONRAD, supra note 144, at 98. 
147. See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 2. It should be noted that they did so in part by 
emphasizing the fact that trade was restricted in the Congo, in contravention of the promises
Leopold had made to the international community. See PAKENHAM, supra note 33, at 586 (“What
was new was that these humanitarians had now joined hands with the men of commerce, God
with Mammon.”). 
148. McStallworth, supra note 140, at 334 (“If the United States had happened to possess in 
Darkest Africa a territory seven times as large and four times as populous as the Philippines, we
too, might find good government difficult and come in for our share of just or unjust criticism.” 
(quoting a February 20, 1906, letter from Root to Congressman Edwin Denby)); id. at 330 (“If I
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1244 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1219
published in 1907 as “The Truth About Congo,” journalist and scholar 
Frederick Starr railed against American “interfere[nce]” in the Congo,
accusing the would-be reformers of having unclean hands: 
The Bantu in the Congo we love. . . . Yet, here he may be whipped,
put on the chain-gang, murdered, and if any raise an outcry he is a
sentimentalist. . . . 
We took the Philippines and Filipinos for their good. So we said. Of 
course, we took them just as the European nations have taken
Africa—for exploitation. . . .
When our hands are clean and when we have given the Filipinos their 
well-deserved independence and free government, and left them to
work out their own salvation, then and not till then, should we
intervene in the Congo Free State for reasons of humanity.149 
Starr was not alone in raising the issue of hypocrisy,150 but 
arguments like his could not silence the outrage. When the nature and 
scale of Leopold’s brutality against the Congolese people became
undeniably apparent, the “Belgian Solution”—referring to Belgium’s 
acquisition of the colony—was generally regarded by reformers as the 
best, and perhaps only viable, option for the future of the Congo.151 The
pressure from those reformers, especially those in the United States,
was the immediate predicate for King Leopold’s capitulation.152 
mistake, not, we had a great deal of trouble and worry in carrying out reforms in the Philippines
after annexation—and if the Powers had demanded a categorical schedule of effective reforms as
a condition of recognizing our annexation of the islands, we might have been
embarrassed.”(quoting another State Department official)); see also PAKENHAM, supra note 33,
at 659 (describing the U.S. Secretary of State’s opinion of the situation in the Congo.)
Remarkably, Leopold inserted himself into the peace negotiations between Spain and the
United States, suggesting that the Spanish lease the Philippines back from the United States. This
proposal collapsed when the United States decided to keep the Philippines for itself. Stengers,
supra note 32, at 255.
The United States would eventually pledge to recognize Philippine independence,
stripping its residents of U.S. nationality in the process. See Jones Act, ch. 416, 39 Stat. 545, 546 
(1916) (declaring the intention of the United States to recognize the independence of the
Philippine Islands in the preamble); Treaty of General Relations and Protocol (“Treaty of Manila
of 1946”), Phil.-U.S., July 4, 1946, 61 Stat. 1174. 
149. FREDERICK STARR, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE CONGO 121–22, 127 (1907). 
150. McStallworth, supra note 140, at 322 (“As if to divert attention from their own 
inadequacies, the Belgians criticized the treatment of the Negro in America . . . .”).
 151. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 257 (“Even Morel, frustrated by the lack of other
politically viable choices, reluctantly advocated what was known as ‘the Belgian solution.’”).
 152. E. D. MOREL’S HISTORY OF THE CONGO REFORM MOVEMENT 194 (Wm. Roger Louis
& Jean Stengers eds., 1968) (“The immediate reason for the King’s decision to hand his African 
domain over to Belgium was that the anti-Congo campaign in America threatened to catch fire.”).
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2020] TRANSFERABLE SOVEREIGNTY 1245
Although he would be able to delay the final transfer with a series of 
obfuscations and drawn-out negotiations, by the end of 1906, it was
clear that King Leopold would have to give up his private colony, and 
that Belgium would have to take it.153 Indeed, in some sense, the sale
had already been made: Félicien Cattier’s contemporary research 
showed that Belgium had already poured money into the colony and
that Leopold had already taken the proceeds.154 
Why Belgium agreed to the deal, however, is a bit more of a
mystery.155 Part of the concern might have been reputational. A 1906 
book by Jesuit writer Arthur Vermeersch argued that “our honour and 
the good name of Belgium are at stake if a country which is governed 
by our King and largely administered by Belgians, is not worthy of the 
esteem and confidence of civilized humanity.”156 Adam Hochschild
reached a similar conclusion in his 1999 book, King Leopold’s Ghost: 
“Oddly enough, Leopold had the Belgian government cornered. The 
Congo reform movement had reached such a pitch of fervor that 
Belgium’s international reputation was at stake.”157 Perhaps more
concretely, if Belgium did not step in to address its king’s misdeeds, it 
faced the very real possibility that some other country would.158 
In any event, neither the buyer nor the seller was happy. As for 
the Belgians, the Daily News reported, “[n]ever before . . . was 
greatness forced by circumstances on a more reluctant people.”159 The 
Washington Post echoed the point: “The annexation of the 
independent state has been received by the public generally, either 
153. Harms, King Leopold’s Bonds, supra note 43, at 356 (“Despite Leopold’s liberal use of 
money to keep friendly journalists on his payroll and to subsidize friendly publications, the 
international pressure was so great that in 1906 he was forced to enter into negotiations with the 
Belgian government for the transfer of control over the Congo.”).
 154. PAKENHAM, supra note 33, at 657; see also  EWANS, supra note 32, at 218 (“Cattier’s
conclusion was that immediate annexation was the only way out of the situation.”).
155. We explore this mystery—and why Belgium saw fit to pay Leopold’s debts at all—in
more detail elsewhere. See Joseph Blocher, Mitu Gulati & Kim Oosterlinck, King Leopold’s
Bonds and the Odious Debts Mystery, 60 VA. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2020). 
156. ASCHERSON, supra note 33, at 258 (quoting Vermeesch’s book and saying that it was
“widely-read”).  
157. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 257–58. 
158. PAKENHAM, supra note 33, at 657 (“How could little Belgium now prevent the Great
Powers intervening against her King? Only by becoming a colonial power herself.”). 
159. EWANS, supra note 32, at 230; see also  VAN REYBROUCK, supra note 44, at 105
(“Belgium assumed its role as colonizer with more gravity than pride.”); Morel, supra note 57 (“It
would be the grossest unfriendliness towards Belgium to give any moral support or sympathy to
the Belgian Government to thrust this white elephant upon the shoulders of the Belgian
people.”).
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1246 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1219
with indifference or the opinion that the Congo will prove a burden
upon the country.”160 
Leopold had long insisted that his goals in the Congo were
humanitarian and that he had pursued them at great personal cost.161 
The terms of the deal largely reflected this narrative of self-sacrifice. 
Never mind the castles and museums he was constructing, or the 
millions he secreted away to himself and his mistress.162 The Belgian 
government would assume the Congo Free State’s enormous debts 
(many owed to Belgium itself), commit to pay for a considerable 
number of Leopold’s ongoing pet projects, and pledge a fifty-million 
franc payment to Leopold “as a mark of gratitude for his great sacrifices 
made for the Congo.”163 
Perhaps more significantly, Leopold squeezed every last bit of 
profit out of his personal colony. With the endgame approaching, he
worked hard to separate his roles as sovereign and owner and to
effectively retain the latter even as he sold the former.164 He would
spend the next two years setting up concessions and companies to
continue exploiting the Congo’s national resources even after he 
handed over formal “governance” authority to Belgium.165 He
established a foundation in Germany and transferred twenty-five 
million francs worth of jewelry and other valuables to it.166 Other secret
companies held valuable real estate across Belgium and the Cote
d’Azur,167 some of it earmarked for Belgian royals, others for officers
returning from the Congo.168 Ultimately, Belgium purchased a hollow 
160. Congo Deficit Likely. Belgium Bound Morally To Stand Sponsor. Securities’ Holders 
May Sue, WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 1908, at 3.
 161. EWANS, supra note 32, at 226 (“Is it not wretched to have been the King of this State for
twenty-two years and to have kept nothing for oneself? After all, I am seventy-two years old and
will not have long to benefit from it.” (emphasis added) (quoting Leopold)).
 162. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 168, 266. 
163. Id. at 259 (emphasis added).
 164. EWANS, supra note 32, at 224 (“Leopold was trying to ensure that in the event of a
takeover, a large part of the Congo would continue to provide revenues which he could use for
his own purposes.”); PAKENHAM, supra note 33, at 660 (“[H]e would give up the territory, but
not the profits of the Congo.”).
 165. EWANS, supra note 32, at 227 (“In October and November of 1906, he announced the 
formation of several companies to which would be transferred prospecting and mining rights in
various areas of the country.”); Harms, King Leopold’s Bonds, supra note 43, at 356 (“Between
1901 and 1907 he had transferred nearly 100 million francs to his Crown Foundation while putting
the Congo Independent State deeply in debt.”).
 166. EWANS, supra note 32, at 231; HOCHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 275–76. 
167. EWANS, supra note 32, at 231. 
168. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 275–76. 
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2020] TRANSFERABLE SOVEREIGNTY 1247
shell of a state,169 and at a hefty price. But in light of the increasing
fervor about atrocities in the Congo and the threat of international 
intervention, Belgium had little choice. 
In the end, Leopold got to have his “magnificent African cake” 
without the calories,170 but he was bitter and resentful nonetheless. The
King’s attendant noted, “[t]he day had been for him one of definitive 
abdication from his personal overseas empire, and he felt a deep 
resentment at the manner in which the transfer of sovereignty had 
come about. . . . It was base and unjust.”171 Demetrius Boulger, who
wrote a fawning two-volume biography of the king in 1925, channeled
that resentment in jaw-dropping fashion: “Human injustice has rarely 
given a more painful exhibition than the treatment meted out to King 
Leopold for his action in the Congo during the last ten years of his life.
Posterity and history will pay a just tribute to all he 
accomplished . . . .”172 Indeed. 
Thanks in part to Leopold’s machinations, it is all but impossible 
to know how much money he made from the Congo. But what is certain
is that, in 1908, he gave up control peacefully for a price. The Congo 
Free State escaped his clutches, and did so without a war. This was not 
freedom—it was still a colony. But it was a major improvement, 
achieved in a remarkable way. For our purposes, the most significant 
fact is that despite major obstacles—a tragedy of unfathomable size,
unclear international rules, and reluctant parties—sovereignty was
transferred away from the person who had purchased it twenty years 
prior. 
169. ASCHERSON, supra note 33, at 263 (“It had served its purpose; cleared of its essential
installations, it could be left to Belgium as an empty house is left to a new landlord.”);
PAKENHAM, supra note 33, at 661. Of course, it was described to the public in precisely the 
opposite terms. In Morel’s acerbic contemporary account:
The transfer is presented to Belgium in this way:—“Here is a potential dependency of
incalculable wealth which already pays its way out of local revenue; with trifling
liabilities and magnificent assets, and a moral obligation towards the founder which it
will be the privilege of the nation to carry out in order to show its profound gratitude 
for benefits conferred.” 
Morel, supra note 57.  
170. Harms, King Leopold’s Bonds, supra note 43, at 344 (“Historians have generally
depicted the Belgian government’s takeover of the Congo in 1908 as a major blow to Leopold,
but . . . it may have been his grandest scheme of all. He managed to pawn off a bankrupt and debt-
ridden colony onto the Belgian government while augmenting his personal fortune.”).
 171. EWANS, supra note 32, at 230. 
172. 2 BOULGER, supra note 32, at 187.
BLOCHER & GULATI IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/16/2020 7:11 PM         
   
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
   
   
   
   
   
     
 
  
   
   
 
  
 
   
 
  
  
1248 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:1219
C. Transfer 3: Congo Pays for its Sovereignty (1960) 
Life improved for the Congolese when Belgium took over,173 but 
the changes were not immediate,and they were mostly in degree rather 
than in kind.174 Congo had gone from being a personal colony to a
public one. To some, this shift represented a significant breakthrough 
for the Congo because at the very least “as a colony it will be subject
to government by discussion.”175 But as a matter of self-governance, 
according to one Congolese scholar, “the transformation of the Congo
from Leopold’s personal possession to a Belgian colony in 1908[] did
not represent a major advance for the Congolese people and their 
quest for freedom and self-determination.”176 
The Belgians retained Leopold’s policy with regard to “vacant”
lands, meaning that such lands—broadly defined, of course—were
subject to expropriation by mining and agricultural enterprises.177 The 
Congolese people could not vote,178 still suffered violence and abject 
poverty, and were still pressed into harvesting cash crops.179 The fact
that the value of rubber had plummeted in the years leading up to the
transfer180 did not help. Notably, the first Belgian minister of colonies 
173. EWANS, supra note 32, at 236 (referring to reports of British consuls); VAN REYBROUCK, 
supra note 44, at 104–10 (noting that “drastic administrative reforms” were put in place, along
with “a change . . . in the attitude with which the colony was governed,” including improvements
to medical treatment).
 174. NZONGOLA-NTALAJA, supra note 122, at 57 n.63 (“[T]he dominant historiography
speaks of King Leopold’s Congo and the Belgian colony as though they were two different
countries, when in fact the laws and regulations as well as colonial agents, settlers and
administrators remained in place, and repression was carried on as usual.”); id. at 26 (“The
Leopoldian system was replaced by a colonial regime that was just as oppressive, albeit in a less
brutal manner.”); see also Heym, supra note 17, at 23 (“Under the benevolent rule of the Belgian 
parliament, the cutting off of human hands was discontinued, but not so the practice of forced
labor.”); NELSON, supra note 15, at 114 (“[T]he Belgian annexation of the Congo ultimately
produced no substantial departures from the policies of Leopold’s Free State.”); VAN
REYBROUCK, supra note 44, at 104 (noting that there was “no complete break with the years
before 1908”).
 175. Reeves, supra note 2, at 118.
 176. NZONGOLA-NTALAJA, supra note 122, at 26.  
177. EWANS, supra note 32, at 237.
 178. See VAN REYBROUCK, supra note 44, at 106. 
179. EWANS, supra note 32, at 239 (“A system of forced labour thus effectively remained a 
feature of the Belgian colonial regime, and this also extended to the compulsory cultivation of
cash crops by peasant farmers.”). 
180. Id. at 236.
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2020] TRANSFERABLE SOVEREIGNTY 1249
“was a former official of a company that had used thousands of forced
laborers to build railways in the eastern Congo.”181 
Medical services, labor contracts, and educational opportunities 
all improved after Leopold’s reign, however, and were probably
comparable to those in neighboring colonies.182 There seemed to be no 
large-scale atrocities like the German slaughter of Hereros, at least.183 
In 1913, even Morel claimed victory, noting that the one major goal not
yet achieved was African ownership of land.184 Even as he folded up his 
advocacy tents, Morel nonetheless warned that “the root of the evil 
[will remain] untouched . . . till the native of the Congo becomes once
more owner of his land and of the produce which it yields.”185 
In a profound sense, the inability of “the native of the Congo” to 
be “owner of his land”—recalling, again, the interplay between
property and sovereignty—would remain the central issue during, and 
even after, the colonial period. As one report put it at the time: “Such 
wrongs could only cause to be born, in the hearts of the natives, feelings 
of hate and revolt, feelings which caused them to await patiently the 
day when they would be stronger.”186 The Congolese natives needed
both the concept and the reality of self-determination, and it would
take decades for those to arrive in Congo.
As late as 1955, Belgians were considering a thirty-year plan for 
Congolese independence.187 Just four years later, in January 1959, mass 
demonstrations broke out in Leopoldville—today known as 
181. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 271; see also id. (“The head of the Belgian Senate 
committee that approved the new colonial budget—which increased ‘taxes in kind’ on Africans,
Morel pointed out—was a shareholder in the notorious rubber concession company, A.B.I.R.”).
 182. EWANS, supra note 32, at 241 (“In fairness to the Belgians, it has to be said that in some
ways, their record in the Congo was no worse, and possibly even better, than that of other African
colonial regimes.”). 
183. Between 1904 and 1908, as Leopold’s rule in the Congo Free State was coming to an end,
German colonial troops slaughtered more than one hundred thousand indigenous peoples in what 
is now Namibia. Germany Sued for Damages of “Forgotten Genocide” in Namibia, GUARDIAN
(Jan. 5, 2017, 5:07 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/05/germany-sued-
forgotten-genocide-namibia-herero-nama [https://perma.cc/G2JJ-ZUVH].
 184. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 273.
 185. Id. at 272 (alteration in original) (omission in original). 
186. EWANS, supra note 32, at 237 (quoting VAN DE KERKEN, LES SOCIÉTÉS BANTOUES DU 
CONGO BELGE 180 (1920)). 
187. See generally A. A. J. Van Bilsen, Un Plan de Trente Ans pour l’Émancipation Politique
de l’Afrique Belge 33 LE DOSSIERS DE L’ACTION SOCIAE CATHOLIQUE 83 (Feb., 1956)
(covering, as translated, “A Thirty-Year Plan for the Political Emancipation of Belgium Africa”).
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Kinshasa—heralding the end of the colonial era.188 These initial 
demonstrations were put down violently by the Force Publique,189 but 
the momentum for independence could not be stopped. Martin Ewans 
identifies two “essential causes” of the January riots: a recession caused 
by falling commodity prices and “the beginnings of political
consciousness among the Congolese.”190 Whatever the causes, the
Belgians ultimately did not put up much resistance, reflecting both the 
strength of the independence movement and the Belgians’ lingering 
ambivalence about their status as a colonial power.191 France
theoretically could have asserted a claim, but renounced its droit du
preference.192 
But just as Congo was effectively made to pay for the transfer from
Leopold to Belgium, it was in many ways pillaged again at the moment 
of independence. The transfers of private assets from Congo to
Belgium were so vast and so quick that they had to be capped.193 
Companies operating in the Congo were permitted to choose either 
Congolese or Belgian affiliation. Most opted for the latter.194 As David 
Van Reybrouck explains, “[t]hey remained active in Congo, but chose
for a registered office in Belgium, effectively placing their company 
under Belgian rather than Congolese governance. That transfer cost 
the Congolese treasury a vast amount of tax revenue.”195 More costly,
188. RUTH SLADE, THE BELGIAN CONGO 17 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter SLADE, THE
BELGIAN CONGO].
 189. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 301.
 190. EWANS, supra note 32, at 243.
 191. Id. (“[I]n the spirit of their traditional reluctance to sustain a colonial role, the Belgians
had little stomach for argument . . . . [T]heir abdication of power developed, over a period of a
mere eighteen months, into an almost full scale rout.”); NZONGOLA-NTALAJA, supra note 122, at
6 (“Shocked by the violence of their presumably happy subjects and lacking the political will for
an Algerian-type colonial war in an international context in which decolonization was the order
of the day, the Belgians opted for a negotiated independence.”).
 192. NZONGOLA-NTALAJA, supra note 122, at 17 (“In 1960, on the eve of Congo’s
independence from Belgium, France had to renounce this right of imperial succession.”). This was
not the droit that Leopold had given it in the 1880s, but one received—along with the island of
Bomo, located in Stanley Pool—from Belgium in 1908 in exchange for resolving a disputed border
and recognizing the transfer from Leopold. New Congo Agreement: Boundary Question Settled
by France and Belgium, MANCHESTER GUARDIAN, Dec. 24, 1908, at 10.
 193. SLADE, THE BELGIAN CONGO, supra note 188, at 76. 
194. See JACQUES DEPELCHIN, FROM THE CONGO FREE STATE TO ZAIRE: HOW BELGIUM
PRIVATIZED THE ECONOMY: A HISTORY OF BELGIAN STOCK COMPANIES IN CONGO-ZAÏRE 
FROM 1885 TO 1974, at 82 (Ayi Kwei Armah trans., 1999) (“The old companies were still present,
but that did not mean they operated in the same way as before. As we shall see later, they had
been emptied of their substance.”).
 195. VAN REYBROUCK, supra note 44, at 262.
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2020] TRANSFERABLE SOVEREIGNTY 1251
three days before independence, the Belgian Parliament and the 
Congolese government effectively denied the new state control over 
Union Minière, the mining giant that helped drive the nation’s 
economy.196 As Van Reybrouck puts it, “The political keys were
already in [Congo’s] pocket, but the economic ones were now safely 
tucked away in Belgium.”197 
But even the political keys were not entirely turned over. The fact 
that Belgium and its Western allies accepted a nominally independent
Congo did not mean that they were willing to accept any and all choice
by the Congolese.198 Only a few months after leading the country to 
independence, the Pan-Africanist hero Patrice Lumumba—the 
Congo’s first democratically elected prime minister—was assassinated, 
his body chopped up and dissolved in acid, apparently with the 
complicity of Belgian intelligence forces and the American CIA.199 Not
until decades later would the Belgian government—confronted with
direct evidence—acknowledge and apologize for its involvement in 
Lumumba’s murder, which was motivated in part by a desire to 
maintain control over the Congo’s resources.200 
Lumumba’s death opened the door for Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, a 
former officer in the Force Publique,201 who would become one of the 
world’s most notorious kleptocratic dictators. For decades, Mobutu
(who changed his name to Mobutu Sese Seko in 1972) would rule 
Congo (renamed Zaire in 1971) with an iron fist, murdering political 
opponents, generating debts in the name of the state, and generally 
plundering its wealth for his own personal use.202 The profits, as in the 
days of old, went to Mobutu himself or to a variety of Western
196. Id. at 263.
 197. Id. 
198. See  NZONGOLA-NTALAJA, supra note 122, at 101–12 (describing efforts by external
powers to shape Congolese government, including by contributing to the fall and assassination of 
Patrice Lumumba and the quelling of the Katanga secession).
 199. VAN REYBROUCK, supra note 44, at 305–08 (describing the assassination).
 200. See Alan Riding, Belgium Confronts Its Heart of Darkness; Unsavory Colonial Behavior
in the Congo Will Be Tackled by a New Study, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2002),
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/21/arts/belgium-confronts-its-heart-darkness-unsavory-colonial-
behavior-congo-will-be.html [https://perma.cc/XC9N-27R6].
 201. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 302.
 202. See Reuben Loffman, In the Shadow of the ‘Great Helmsman’: Mobutu Sese Seko’s Life
and Legacy in the DR Congo, AFR. LSE BLOG, (Sept. 7, 2017), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ 
africaatlse/2017/09/07/in-the-shadow-of-the-great-helmsman-mobutu-sese-sekos-life-and-legacy-
in-the-dr-congo [https://perma.cc/8U2D-2CBB] (“Rather than a by-word for the optimistic
nationalism of the late 1960s, Mobutism became a synonym for kleptocratic rule and remains one
of Mobutu’s lasting legacies to this day.”).
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companies.203 When Laurent Kabila’s forces rose in power against 
Mobutu in the 1990s, foreign companies cut lucrative mining deals with 
the rebel forces as well.204 
By the time Mobutu was overthrown in 1997, the Congo had once
again been hollowed out, reduced to “a shell, with a worthless 
currency, a decomposed civil service, and a President apparently
indifferent to the hollow nature of his power or to the fact that he 
symbolised grotesque theft.”205 King Leopold’s ghost still haunted the
Congo. 
II. THE THEORY: TRANSFERABLE SOVEREIGNTY
Our goal is not to cast new light on the horror and oppression that 
the Congo has experienced over the past century, but to explore them 
through a particular lens: the acquisition, transfer, and purchase of 
sovereign control. In the preceding Part, we have tried to highlight the
ways in which sovereign control has been treated as a thing that can be
“owned” and transferred.  
For much of the Congo’s history, the very idea that sovereignty
can be owned made life worse for millions of Congolese. It allowed 
Leopold to “buy” their country—although really the nominal 
purchases mattered less than the international community’s complicity
and recognition—and exploit them for financial gain. But it was also
the transferability of sovereignty that ultimately brought the horror to
an end, via Belgium’s purchase of the Congo Free State. That raises 
several questions: Can transfers of sovereignty—including forced sales
of the kind that took place in 1908—be used to prevent oppression 
from reaching the point of genocide? Under what conditions, and with 
what risks? Finally, how could the model apply to concrete
203. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 303; Bill Berkeley, Zaire: An African Horror Story, 
ATLANTIC (Aug. 1993) https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1993/08/zaire-an-african-
horror-story/305496 [https://perma.cc/RPR5-N3AB] (“By 1980 it was estimated that officials were
skimming off at least $240 million a year from the nationalized [mining] resource. More recently
a World Bank investigation estimated that up to $400 million . . . inexplicably vanished from the 
country’s foreign-exchange accounts in 1988.”).
 204. Id. at 286–87; Cindy Shiner, U.S. Firms Stake Claims in Zaire’s War, WASH. POST, Apr. 
17, 1996, at A01. Decades earlier, Depelchin alleges, Union Minière had financed the Katanga
secession bid after its economic interests were threatened by political change. DEPELCHIN, supra 
note 194, at 181.
 205. EWANS, supra note 32, at 245 (quoting Kaye Whiteman, The Single-Minded Pursuit of 
Wealth, GUARDIAN NEWS SERV., Sept. 9, 1997).
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2020] TRANSFERABLE SOVEREIGNTY 1253
contemporary scenarios? The following Sections address those three 
questions in order. 
A. The Possible Benefits of Forced Sales of Sovereign Control 
King Leopold’s sale of sovereign control to Belgium was hardly a
perfect solution, but it did bring the mass murder to an end. Could such
a solution be employed today to resolve similarly thorny situations of 
arguable oppression? Would the world be a better place if the Kurds 
had the right to buy their sovereignty from Iraq and either become
independent or join some other sovereign? The Uyghurs from China? 
The Tamils from Sri Lanka? The Kashmiris from India and Pakistan? 
Each situation is complex and distinct, and there is no single 
approach that could resolve them all. Faced with a situation like that
in Leopold’s Congo in 1908—or, for that matter, Joseph Kabila’s
Congo today206—the international community might first resort to
diplomacy. If that fails, the next step might be economic sanctions. 
Where the situation is truly horrific and not responsive to pressure,
international law might provide a right of exit for the oppressed people, 
either individually as refugees or en masse in the form of a secession.207 
And there is a lively debate about whether the rest of the world has a 
responsibility to protect (“R2P”) in certain circumstances.208 
206. See Kimiko de Freytas-Tamura, After Tarnished Election, Opposition Figure Becomes 
Congo’s President, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/24/ 
world/africa/congo-president-inauguration-tshisekedi-kabila.html [https://perma.cc/ZR89-S6FN]
(noting that Congo’s recent election is “widely considered to be illegitimate,” and that Kabila’s
most vociferous opponent is “widely believed to have won the election”).
207. Although it is not necessary to our argument here, we believe there to be growing
agreement on the existence of a right to remedial secession. That said, it is not clear what precisely
counts as severe oppression and how much support the international community will provide, if
at all. The right goes back at least to 1920 and the claim of the Aalanders and their right to
separate from Finland and unite with Sweden. See The Aaland Islands Question: Report
Submitted to the Council of the League of Nations by the Commission of Rapporteurs, League
of Nations Doc. B7/21/68/106 (1921); see also Milena Sterio, Self-Determination and Secession
Under International Law: The Cases of Kurdistan and Catalonia, 22 ASIL INSIGHTS (2018), 
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/22/issue/1/self-determination-and-secession-under-international-
law-cases-kurdistan [https://perma.cc/GT7N-XLKV].
208. For a broad overview, see generally INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION & STATE 
SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2001), http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ 
ICISS%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/QTR5-RX9G]. For a collection of criticism, see 
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (Philip Cunliffe ed., 2011).
Given the unprecedented scale of the mass displacement, the debate is particularly important as
it relates to the ongoing refugee crisis. For an examination of that intersection, see generally E. 
Tendayi Achiume, Syria, Cost-sharing, and the Responsibility To Protect Refugees, 100 MINN. L.
REV. 687 (2015).
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Forced sales of sovereignty potentially represent another arrow in 
the quiver of humanitarian activists. Indeed, they combine several 
characteristics of some of the standard options. Like secessions, they 
deprive oppressive leaders of sovereign territory. And like migration, 
they involve a change in who exercises sovereign control over a
particular group of people. 
That said, both essential characteristics of forced sales are worth 
exploring in more detail: first, that they are forced, and second, that 
they are sales. As to the former, it is significant that the kinds of 
transfers we have in mind here do not necessarily involve
straightforward offer and acceptance, although such notions have 
indeed been suggested for the removal of dictators.209 The precise
terms of the Congo Free State’s sale involved a fair bit of negotiation,210 
but Leopold ultimately had no choice but to sell.
This structure of entitlement is not unusual in law. It corresponds 
to what Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed call a “liability rule”— 
an entitlement that can be taken, but only at a price determined by a 
third party.211 In U.S. law, takings are an example: a property owner 
cannot refuse to turn over her land for public use but is entitled to just
compensation for doing so.212 By contrast, a “property rule” gives the
holder of the entitlement the power to set the reserve price: if Leopold 
had demanded $500 billion, the international community would have 
had to pay it to acquire the Congo from him.213 
There is an extensive literature about when and why liability rules 
or property rules are to be preferred. One thread is that liability rules 
tend to make more sense when bargaining costs are prohibitive and the 
holders of the property rights are unwilling to move assets to their best
209. See, e.g., Brian Klaas, Golden Handcuffs: Getting Dictators To Exit, GLOBALIST (Feb. 
25, 2017), https://www.theglobalist.com/golden-handcuffs-getting-dictators-to-exit [https://perma.cc/
QZ6M-8WQM]. It is notable in this regard that the Mo Ibrahim Foundation already offers a $5
million prize for former African leaders who, among other things, have peacefully transferred
power to a successor. Id.; see Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in African Leadership, MO IBRAHIM
FOUND., http://mo.ibrahim.foundation/prize [https://perma.cc/4NU8-PDVK]. 
210. See supra notes 151–72 and accompanying text.
 211. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972). 
212. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
213. As detailed above, Belgium did in fact pay an extraordinary amount for the Congo Free
State—though, it seems, not enough to satisfy Leopold. See supra notes 163–72 and accompanying
text.
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2020] TRANSFERABLE SOVEREIGNTY 1255
uses.214 And in situations of oppressive governance, that seems almost 
inevitable: the situations are complex, there are innumerable
stakeholders, a high potential for inefficient holdout behavior, and so 
on. As legal remedies, liability rules correspond with damages; 
property rules correspond with injunctions. Another way to
conceptualize our project, then, is as reorienting international 
responses away from the equivalent of injunctions—R2P, for 
example—and toward damages remedies; away from property rules 
and toward liability rules.
That raises the second notable feature of the forced-sales 
alternative: that it involves sales. One might object to the label on the 
basis that the selling party has no choice but to accept the offer—we
are happy to accept any other label, though we think that this one 
works well enough.215 What is notable about the sales aspect is not the 
name but the fact of using money to effectively buy a way out of a 
humanitarian crisis. For some, this will raise concerns of
commodification. But it is worth noting that international responses to 
humanitarian crises already rely on—or, depending on one’s 
perspective, suffer from—economic incentives. Economic sanctions,
for example, precisely reflect that preoccupation with financial 
motivations, as do many other diplomatic interventions.216 Moreover, 
as the international response to the current refugee crisis has 
demonstrated—and vividly so in the case of Myanmar’s Rohingya 
population—nations privilege their perceived economic self-interest, 
even in the face of what might seem to be overwhelming moral 
imperatives.217 
214. Eric Posner and Glen Weyl make an analogous point in the preface to their recent book,
using the example of the favelas in Rio. See  ERIC A. POSNER & E. GLEN WEYL, RADICAL 
MARKETS: UPROOTING CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY FOR A JUST SOCIETY xiii–xvii (2018)
(detailing how Rio’s distribution of property rights has not resulted in the best use of city spaces:
“[s]lum dwellers hang on to property that could instead be a public park, a nature preserve, or
modern housing,” whereas the wealthy monopolize the city center while being “too fearful of
crime to enjoy it”). 
215. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE FUTURE OF LAW & ECONOMICS: ESSAYS IN REFORM AND 
RECOLLECTION 129 (2016) (noting that “liability-rule charges often look like, and are properly
described as, prices”).
216. For an explanation of one prominent contemporary example, see generally CLARE
RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF10715, VENEZUELA: OVERVIEW OF U.S.
SANCTIONS (2019).
217. Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, Competing for Refugees: A Market-Based Solution to a 
Humanitarian Crisis, 48 COL. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 53, 58–59 (2016) (advocating for a debt-based
approach to certain refugee situations). 
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Responding to our prior work describing economic transfers of 
sovereign control,218 some have argued that the market we describe is 
exceptionally thin and that there will not be enough demand to support 
it.219 The purchase of the Congo Free State provides a kind of proof of 
concept—a successfully culminated sale, under the most difficult of 
conditions. 
Of course, the fact that this solution worked once in unusual 
circumstances does not mean that it would work again. Nor does the
extraordinary situation in the Congo Free State—a private colony,
subject to a type and level of oppression that today is fortunately rare— 
provide a clear “test” for when such solutions should be invoked again. 
And yet it is hard not to ignore contemporary possibilities.  
Consider the Russian takeover of Crimea in 2014.220 Following a 
popular revolt and the ouster of Ukraine’s pro-Russian president,
Viktor Yanukovych, Russia took control of Crimea, a Ukrainian
territory with long-standing ties to Russia.221 Conflict with Russia— 
until then, Ukraine’s primary trading partner222—had put Ukrainian 
finances under stress, and it was on the brink of defaulting on its
external debt.223 Ukraine’s biggest creditor was none other than Russia,
which had lent Yanukovych’s government $3 billion some months prior 
to his ouster in an attempt to prop it up.224 Another complicating factor
was that the population of Crimea seemed to favor joining Russia
rather than staying with Ukraine.225 Indeed, Russia’s official position
was that it had not taken Crimea, but that the Crimeans had chosen to 
218. See Blocher & Gulati, A Market for Sovereign Control, supra note 5.
 219. See supra note 21. 
220. See generally Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, Ukraine and Russia: “You Break It, You
Bought It,” 111 FIN. HIST., Fall 2014, at 28 [hereinafter Blocher & Gulati, Ukraine and Russia].
 221. See id. at 29; Andrew Roth, Ukraine’s Ex-President Viktor Yanukovych Found Guilty of 
Treason, GUARDIAN (Jan. 25, 2019, 8:12 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/25/ 
ukraine-ex-president-viktor-yanukovych-found-guilty-of-treason [https://perma.cc/8QLZ-GK8U].
 222. See Blocher & Gulati, Ukraine and Russia, supra note 220, at 29 (noting that Russia was
Ukraine’s “primary backer” and a crucial trading partner to countries in the West). 
223. Id. at 30 (noting that Russia’s government-owned gas company was demanding $11.4 
billion in past subsidies from Ukraine and speculating that Ukraine’s “debt-to-GDP might soon
be in the 100% range”).
 224. Andrey Ostroukh, Russia Files Suit Against Ukraine over $3 Billion Loan, WALL ST. J.,
(Feb. 17, 2016, 10:47 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-files-suit-against-ukraine-over-3-
billion-loan-1455722776 [https://perma.cc/AUC9-SHCU].
 225. See Blocher & Gulati, Ukraine and Russia, supra note 220, at 29.
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2020] TRANSFERABLE SOVEREIGNTY 1257
secede from Ukraine to avoid oppression and discrimination that they 
faced because of their largely Russian roots.226 
Assume for a moment that there is truth to this—that the people 
of Crimea were indeed subject to severe, albeit not genocidal,
mistreatment. If so, then perhaps the taking of Crimea could be viewed 
by the world as a kind of forced sale, conceptually akin to Belgium’s 
purchase—a justifiable transfer, but not a free one. Of course, there is 
no way that Ukraine can get Russia to cut a check, but that is not the
only way for it be compensated. After taking Crimea, Russia went on 
to sue Ukraine for its defaulted debt in a U.K. court.227 And one of the
Ukrainian responses could have been that Russia had stolen Ukrainian 
property—that is, Crimea—worth a great deal more than $3 billion.228 
Even if Ukraine has no way to force Russia to pay, surely it could offset
the value of Crimea against the debt incurred to Russia by its puppet, 
Yanukovych. 
To be clear, we are not endorsing the Russian account of Crimea’s
treatment, nor endorsing the takeover. We mean it as an illustration. 
And we recognize that the possibility of a forced sale in these 
circumstances is not likely to make everyone—perhaps anyone— 
happy. But as of now, Russia has taken Crimea and paid nothing.
Ukraine has no realistic possibility of getting the territory back. Under 
the forced-sale alternative, they would at least get out from under the 
Russians’ thumb with regard to the debt.
Similar questions might be asked about other contemporary 
secessionist movements: Catalonia, Scotland, and Rakhine, to name a 
226. See Anton Moiseienko, What Do Russian Lawyers Say About Crimea?, OPINIO JURIS
(Sept. 24, 2014, 9:51 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/09/24/guest-post-russian-lawyers-say-crimea
[https://perma.cc/QJD3-VZST]; Valerie Pacer, Vladimir Putin’s Justification for Russian Action
in Crimea Undermines His Previous Arguments over Syria, Libya and Iraq, LSE EUROPP BLOG
(Mar. 11, 2014), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2014/03/11/vladimir-putins-justification-for-
russian-action-in-crimea-undermines-his-previous-arguments-over-syria-libya-and-iraq [https://perma.cc/
3S4L-882T].
227. For a discussion of this dispute, see generally W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Contract Law
and Ukraine’s $3 Billion Debt to Russia, 11 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 244 (2016). A miniature version of
this dispute is also playing out in a dispute over artifacts from a set of Crimean museums that had
been loaned to a museum in Amsterdam before the Russian takeover. The museums, which are 
under Russian control, and Ukraine and Russia are each demanding that the artifacts be returned
to them. See Yuliya Talmazan, Russia and Ukraine Are Locked in a Legal Dispute over Ancient
Gold, NBC NEWS (Mar. 16, 2019, 4:01 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/russia-
ukraine-are-locked-legal-dispute-over-ancient-gold-n982606 [https://perma.cc/42TN-VRXJ].
 228. See Weidemaier, supra note 227, at 245–46 (noting that since Russia annexed Crimea, 
Ukraine’s economy has been “severely hamstr[u]ng” so that “it would be exceedingly difficult if
not impossible for Ukraine to pay the $3 billion” debt).
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few. International law does not provide a satisfactory range of options 
in these situations. In particular, other than the narrow circumstances 
of genocide, ethnic cleansing, or the equivalent, international law 
seems to have no mechanism by which regions that are stuck in bad 
relationships with parent sovereigns can escape and improve their 
situation. Our comparatively modest suggestion is that in the proper 
circumstances, and with due restrictions, forced sales could be such an
option. 
B. The Challenge of “Owning” Sovereignty 
Sovereignty is not typically conceptualized as a species of 
property—as a thing that can be owned. If anything, scholars have 
tended to focus on the converse question of whether and how property 
is a kind of sovereignty229: the “sole and despotic dominion” that 
Blackstone described.230 And yet in many ways sovereign control has 
standard characteristics of property that manifest in some of the most 
prominent challenges of international law and relations. The refugee 
crisis, to take just one example, is in part a product of nations exercising 
their right to exclude.231 Perhaps, then, a property-like approach— 
treating sovereign control as a thing that can be owned and 
transferred—can provide a partial solution. Such is the basic normative
framework of our project. 
But the history of the Congo Free State also illustrates the 
challenges of a property-like approach to sovereignty. First, who really
gets to “own” sovereignty? An individual? The nation? The people?
We think that international law and practice have effectively 
repudiated the first alternative, namely Leopold’s, and is currently
struggling to accommodate the second and third. Indeed, the Congo
Free State itself can be understood as an important harbinger of the 
tension between nations’ right to territorial integrity and the right of
peoples to self-determination. Ultimately, and especially in cases of 
oppression, we think that the ownership right must rest with the 
people. 
229. See supra note 27. 
230. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2. 
231. For a discussion of the complicated interaction between these concepts, with particular
reference to the right of exclusion, see generally Matthias Goldmann, The Entanglement of 
Sovereignty and Property in International Law: From German Southwest Africa to the Great
Land Grab? (Oct. 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
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2020] TRANSFERABLE SOVEREIGNTY 1259
That raises the second question: Does, or should, the ownership of 
sovereignty really carry with it a power to transfer, and under what 
conditions? There is no easy answer to this question; elsewhere we 
have tried to sketch a general framework.232 For present purposes, the 
most important point is that transfers of sovereign control can, in cases 
like that of the Congo Free State, help reduce oppression and improve 
welfare. 
We can begin with the issue of ownership itself. As a matter of 
sovereign control, what makes the Congolese example extraordinary is 
that the Congo Free State was owned by Leopold in his individual
capacity: he had purchased sovereignty, and the members of the
recognized international community, many of whom were involved in 
similar deals, went along.233 As Félicien Cattier noted at the time, “In 
a word, Leopold II possesses personally . . . save where he thinks it 
advisable to delegate them to others, all the prerogatives that popular 
custom recognises to Sovereign States.”234 He was “the titulary of 
sov[e]reignty. All the rights and all the duties of government are 
summarised and incorporated in his person.”235 He used those rights to 
his personal economic benefit, and ignored the duties.  
International law and practice no longer allow this kind of private 
sovereign control for personal benefit. But the notion that sovereignty 
can be owned has never been repudiated. Instead, traditional 
conceptions of international law continue to treat sovereignty as the
property of states. There is perhaps no better evidence of this than the
traditional rule that countries have a nearly unbridled power to cede 
sovereign territory to one another without approval of the affected 
regions.236 This means that, while the Leopolds of the world can no
232. Blocher & Gulati, A Market for Sovereign Control, supra note 5.
 233. PRESS, supra note 37, at 224 (“In the case of Africa . . . the salient point was that 
governing rights were up for sale to the highest bidder, whether state, man, or company.”).
 234. EWANS, supra note 32, at 106 (quoting F. CATTIER, DE L’ÉTAT INDÉPENDANT DU 
CONGO 134 (Paris, 1898)). 
235. Id. at 105.
236. On this point, an international law treatise states:
The hardship involved for the inhabitants of the territory who remain and lose their
old citizenship and are handed over to a new sovereign whether they like it or not, 
created a movement in favour of the claim that no cession should be valid until the 
inhabitants had by a plebiscite given their consent to the cession. . . . But it cannot be
said that international law makes it a condition of every cession that it should be ratified
by a plebiscite.
1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 684 (Robert Jennings & Arthur 
Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) (footnote omitted); see also Steven R. Ratner, Land Feuds and Their
Solutions: Finding International Law Beyond the Tribunal Chamber, 100 AM. J. INT’L. L. 808, 811
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longer barter sovereign control, states can—the United States, for 
example, could theoretically sell or simply cast off Puerto Rico.237 
One of our goals is to pinpoint a clear limit on this startling 
principle. Treating sovereign territory as the property of states fails to 
account for the rights and interests of the people living on that
territory.238 On the other hand, territorial sovereignty of states remains 
a basic principle of international law. Indeed, reconciliation of self-
determination and territorial sovereignty is a central challenge for 
contemporary international law.239 
That challenge is not new. The eighteenth-century European 
scholar Emer de Vattel, to take one illustration, accepted the power of 
nations to alienate public property240 but would have placed some
restrictions on their ability to transfer sovereign control over people:
(2006) (“[S]tates generally are free to agree on the disposition of disputed . . . territory . . . as they
see fit. . . . [S]tates are still under no general duty to consult . . . the population of a disputed
territory with respect to its future status.”); cf. Seokwoo Lee, Continuing Relevance of Traditional
Modes of Territorial Acquisition in International Law and a Modest Proposal, 16 CONN. J. INT’L 
L. 1, 10 (2000) (“International law does not seem to prescribe any specific limits on the right of a
state to cede its territory.”).
 237. See Christina Duffy Burnett, Untied States: American Expansion and Territorial
Deannexation, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 797, 801–02 (2005) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decisions
in the Insular Cases “stood for the proposition that the acquisition of a territory by the United
States could be followed by its separation from the United States . . . [creating] a constitutional
doctrine of territorial deannexation.”). But see Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, Puerto Rico and
the Right of Accession, 43 YALE J. INT’L. L. 229, 235 (2018) [hereinafter Blocher & Gulati, Puerto
Rico and the Right of Accession] (arguing that international law would not, and should not, allow
this). 
238. See generally Blocher & Gulati, Puerto Rico and the Right of Accession, supra note 237, 
at 234 (“[I]t is no longer acceptable to treat former colonies as property . . . . We have argued
elsewhere that this political and legal transformation also included a right of colonies to resist
unwanted ‘independence’ and to remain part of the metropole—an alternative form of self-
determination.”).
239. Michael P. Scharf, Earned Sovereignty: Juridical Underpinnings, 31 DENV. J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 373, 373 (2003) (“[T]he defining issue in international law for the 21st century is finding
compromises between the principles of self-determination and the sanctity of borders.” (quoting
Lorie M. Graham, Self-Determination for Indigenous Peoples After Kosovo: Translating Self-
Determination “Into Practice” and “Into Peace,” 6 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 455, 465 (2000))). 
240. As Vattel puts it:
The nation, being the sole mistress of the property in her possession, may dispose of it
as she thinks proper, and may lawfully alienate or mortgage it. This right is a necessary
consequence of the full and absolute domain . . . . Those who think otherwise, cannot 
allege any solid reason for their opinion . . . .
EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE,
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS bk. I, ch. XXI, § 257,
at 116 (Joseph Chitty ed., Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1867) (1758).
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2020] TRANSFERABLE SOVEREIGNTY 1261
Some have dared to advance this monstrous principle, that the 
conqueror is absolute master of his conquest,—that he may dispose 
of it as his property . . . and hence they derive one of the sources of
despotic government. But, disregarding such writers, who reduce men 
to the state of transferable goods or beasts of burthen,—who deliver
them up as the property or patrimony of another man,—let us argue
on principles countenanced by reason and conformable to
humanity.241 
But even Vattel did not conclude that transfers were forbidden.242 
He argued instead that approval must be given by the true “owners” of 
the territory—the people. He explained: “as the nation alone has a 
right to subject itself to a foreign power, the right of really alienating 
the state can never belong to the sovereign, unless it be expressly given
him by the entire body of the people.”243 
In the Congo, it was in significant part the reduction of “men to
the state of transferable goods or beasts of burthen,”244 to take Vattel’s 
phrase, that produced a change in the Congo’s status. The United 
States had—ironically, given its hand in enabling Leopold to take 
sovereignty in the Congo—been innovators in taking the position that 
sovereignty belonged to the people and not to some distant European 
monarch. And, in fact, the United States very nearly took this position
during the Berlin Conference, where the international community
recognized Leopold’s claim to the Congo.
The United States’ position was advanced by John Kasson, a
famous Iowa lawyer and politician and close associate of Abraham 
Lincoln; he had helped draft the antislavery platform for the
Republican National Convention of 1860.245 As the U.S. representative
241. VATTEL, supra note 240, bk. III, ch. XIII, § 201, at 388.
 242. Stéphane Beaulac, Vattel’s Doctrine on Territory Transfers in International Law and the
Cession of Louisiana to the United States of America, 63 LA. L. REV. 1327, 1345 (2003) (noting 
that Vattel would allow states to make such sales without the consent of the residents of the 
transferred territory in times of emergency). 
243. VATTEL, supra note 240, bk. 1, ch. V, § 69, at 31. Beaulac adds: 
Vattel is clear that the express and unanimous consent of the individuals living in the 
part of the territory ceded is required because ‘sovereignty’ belongs to the people and
is thus unalienable. The only exception is in situations of pressing necessity or danger
to public safety (such as in the context of wars), which validate the cession of territory
as between the parties to such treaties. As for individuals living there, they are not
bound by even such a necessary transfer unless they consent to it, which may be implied
by their mere silence.
Beaulac, supra note 242, at 1345. 
244. VATTEL, supra note 240, bk. III, ch. XIII, § 201, at 388.
 245. See  BENJAMIN F. GUE, 4 HISTORY OF IOWA FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES TO THE
BEGINNING OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 149–51 (1903).
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in Berlin, Kasson declared that “the Government of the United States 
would gladly adhere to a more extended rule to be based on a principle
which should aim at the voluntary consent of the natives whose country 
is taken possession of, in all cases where they had not provoked the 
aggression.”246 This bit is particularly fascinating because the U.S. 
government had the dubious honor247 of being the first nation to 
recognize Leopold’s sovereignty, with promises of free trade being 
essential to the endorsement.248 
The Kasson proposal, although not explicitly rejected, was 
bypassed. Koskenniemi notes, “Despite the (somewhat ambiguously 
formulated) proposal by the American delegate at the Berlin 
Conference, Mr. Kasson, . . . no requirement of native consent was 
included in the Berlin Act—although the conference did recommend
that such consent be normally secured.”249 Perhaps this was because
Leopold and his proxies were able to persuade others of their 
humanitarian motives and that the treaties with the natives did actually 
constitute consent. If that is the case, then one could argue that some
combination of the promise to be a benevolent ruler and the consent 
of the natives—regardless of their religion and color—was, as early as 
the late 1800s, considered a requirement for a sale of sovereign 
control.250 A more cynical view, however, is that the Kasson proposal 
was implicitly rejected in part because the treaties that Stanley and
others had secured surely failed to meet this requirement, and also 
because of the more conceptual objection that treaties of cession could
246. REEVES, supra note 32, at 47. 
247. Mark Twain imagines Leopold’s view of the decision ten years later: “Possibly the
Yankees would like to take that back, now, but they will find that my agents are not over there in
America for nothing. But there is no danger; neither nations nor governments can afford to
confess a blunder.” TWAIN, supra note 17, at 37. 
248. See 15 CONG. REC. 2274, 2275–76 (1884) (statement of Sen. Morgan) (referring a report 
to the Appropriations Committee, “expressing the views of the committee [on Foreign Relations]
in reference to that country and its political situation” and recommending a provision of money 
to send diplomatic agents to the Congo); see also REEVES, supra note 32, at 51 (noting that
American recognition came six months before the Berlin Conference). See generally James Thuo
Gathii, How American Support for Freedom of Commerce Legitimized King Leopold’s Territorial
Ambitions in the Congo, 37 STUD. TRANSNAT’L LEGAL POL’Y 97 (2005) (describing the role
played by the United States’ desire for trading access in Africa in its legitimation of King
Leopold’s sovereignty over the Congo Free State).
 249. KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 28, at 138; see also McStallworth, supra note 140, at 342
(“Significantly, the formalities of occupation on a basis of native consent, was a new emphasis
which we introduced to the Powers.”).
250. For a discussion of these issues in context of the German occupation of Southwest Africa,
see Goldmann, supra note 231. 
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2020] TRANSFERABLE SOVEREIGNTY 1263
only be concluded between “States that recognize international law.”251 
In any event, the end result was that the Berlin Conference solidified 
Leopold’s claim to the Congo Free State.252 
Even the reformers seemed unable to imagine a role for the 
Congolese in determining their own future. As Hochschild notes, “only
one alternative to Leopold’s control of the Congo was ever really 
considered: its becoming a colony of Belgium.”253 Morel himself 
accepted “the Belgian solution,”254 though a few years later he would
argue—in the context of World War I—that no territory should change 
hands without a plebiscite of its residents.255 In July 1906, the Belgian 
solution became official British policy,256 and it was echoed in signals 
from the United States, Germany, and France.257 American support 
had legitimized Leopold’s acquisition in the first place;258 without it, he
stood to lose everything.259 
As at the Berlin Conference, the real party in interest was absent 
from the negotiations: the Congolese who would ultimately foot the 
bill.260 Effectively, they were made—with no say in the matter—to pay
for an escape from one particularly cruel European imperialist to one 
251. KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 28, at 138 (quoting a report by Ferdinand Martitz); see also 
ANDREW FITZMAURICE, SOVEREIGNTY, PROPERTY AND EMPIRE, 1500–2000, at 285–87 (2014)
(describing the competing contemporary legal theories on this point).
252. The United States never actually ratified the Berlin Act—the election of 1884 brought
Grover Cleveland into office, and with him a return to isolationism. McStallworth, supra note 
140, at 338–39. 
253. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 257; see also ANSTEY, supra note 16, at 13 (“Amongst the
Congo Reformers Belgian annexation was a solution which some were loath to espouse, but to 
which there was no effective alternative.”); VAN REYBROUCK, supra note 44, at 97 (“The
international pressure on King Leopold II was mounting. Something had to give, and the only 
option was for Leopold to part with his overseas territory and for Belgium to take over Congo.”);
McStallworth, supra note 140, at 328 n.61 (noting that British Foreign Minister Edward Grey
“stated that it was senseless to prevent annexation. Belgium was the only logical contender”).
 254. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 257.
 255. Id. at 289.
 256. EWANS, supra note 32, at 225.
 257. Id. at 225–26. 
258. PRESS, supra note 37, at 3 (“So forceful and efficacious was this support that, for a time, 
European diplomats referred to the Independent State as ‘the United States of the Congo.’”
(quoting Letter from Richard von Schmidthals to Otto von Bismarck (May 14, 1885) (on file with
the Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, London 388))). 
259. See EWANS, supra note 32, at 227.
 260. See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 259 (“Those funds were not expected to come from
the Belgian taxpayer. They were to be extracted from the Congo itself.”); PAKENHAM, supra note 
33, at 662 (“On these modest terms – that would cost the Africans of the Congo ninety-five million
francs (£3.8 million) – the King agreed to hand over the whole Congo, lock, stock and barrel, to
little Belgium.”). 
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that pledged to be less so.261 Compounding the perversity, much of the
purchase price ended up back in Belgium, as Leopold poured funds 
into construction projects, museums, and the like,262 burnishing his own
legacy while the Congolese were saddled with the debt.263 In a scathing 
article, Morel wrote of the Congolese living in the crown domain, “The 
natives who have the privilege of being enslaved in this particular area,
will have the honour of contributing substantial sums to the Civil List 
of future Belgian monarchs and their offspring.”264 
The Belgian construction projects left a tangible legacy of the 
horrors of the Congo Free State. But the end of Leopold’s reign also 
helped lay conceptual foundations in international law itself. The 
impact of the Congo’s acquisition and the Berlin Conference is well
recognized in that regard, but so too are there lessons to be learned 
from its forced sale. Why did Belgium pay the cost, when after all it had 
not facilitated the acquisition and was one of the last countries to
recognize Leopold’s claim?265 Why did the international community 
respond as strongly as it did? Were the stakes purely political and 
moral, or were they in some sense “legal”?
We cannot make a strong causal claim, but it is worth noting that 
in the demise of the Congo Free State, one sees glimpses of what would 
later be regarded as important principles of international law. U.S.
261. Specifically:
The Congolese taxpayer was left with responsibility not only for the Free State’s debt
of 110 million francs but also for a ‘gratitude fund’ given to the king ‘in testimony for
his great sacrifice in favor of the Congo created by him,’ as well as for another 40 million
francs for the so-called Niederfulbach Foundation, one of the king’s financial
instruments, which was ultimately transferred to the Belgian state in 1923. 
L. H. GANN & PETER DUIGNAN, THE RULERS OF BELGIAN AFRICA 1884–1914, at 151 (1979); 
see also Steven P. Johnson, King Leopold II’s Exploitation of the Congo From 1885 to 1908 and
Its Consequences 70 (2014) (unpublished B.A. thesis, University of Central Florida),
https://stars.library.ucf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2641&context=honorstheses1990-2015
[https://perma.cc/Y9WV-ZHYF] (“Instead of cancelling the debt that was amassed forcefully and
unethically, Belgium only sought to increase the Congo Free State’s debt which added to the 
taxation burden during the [Belgian] Great Depression.”).
 262. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 168.
 263. Fury Caused by Leopold’s Trick, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1907, at C1; see also
HOCHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 259 (“Those funds were not expected to come from the Belgian
taxpayer. They were to be extracted from the Congo itself.”). That the debts were seen as
obligatory at all has serious implications for the doctrine of odious debts. See generally Blocher,
Gulati & Oosterlinck, supra note 155. 
264. Morel, supra note 57. 
265. For some initial thoughts on this question, see Joseph Blocher, Mitu Gulati & Kim
Oosterlinck, Why Did Belgium Pay Leopold’s Bonds?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 
2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3468518 [https://perma.cc/YP56-
GQPX]. 
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2020] TRANSFERABLE SOVEREIGNTY 1265
President Woodrow Wilson—whose views on race were hardly
progressive—said in 1918: “[P]eoples . . . are not to be bartered about
from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and 
pawns in a game . . . .”266 
Over the next few decades, haltingly at first and then quickly in
the 1950s and 1960s, the principle that Wilson described would become
part of international practice, at least in the colonies. This concept was 
the right of self-determination—the power of “peoples” to decide their 
own national affiliation.267 Although its precise legal status remains 
unclear,268 the general trajectory of self-determination has been from a
political principle to a right recognized in foundational legal documents 
such as the U.N. Charter.269 It reflected and helped generate a
fundamental change in the way people conceptualize the relationship
between sovereign territory and who should get to control it. 
The development of human rights law is often traced to the post– 
World War II era, but the denunciation of Leopold suggests the
possibility that sovereigns had humanitarian obligations decades 
earlier—and that failure to meet them could mean a forfeit of 
sovereign control. Scholars today debate the existence of a 
“responsibility to protect” through military or other intervention.270 
266. Woodrow Wilson, Address to Congress, Analyzing German and Austrian Peace
Utterances, Delivered in Joint Session (Feb. 11, 1918), in 1  THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF
WOODROW WILSON 472, 478 (Albert Shaw ed., 1924); cf. VATTEL, supra note 240, bk. I, ch. XXI,
§ 263, at 118 (arguing that a nation “has not . . . a right to traffic with their rank and liberty, on
account of any advantages it may expect to derive from such a negotiation”).
 267. See SHARON KORMAN, THE RIGHT OF CONQUEST: THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY 
BY FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 36–37 (1996) (tracing the domestic principle 
to the French Enlightenment, and citing Vattel to support the international version); see also
Goldmann, supra note 231, at 5–6 (describing the transformation of views about what sovereignty
in the colonial context was supposed to entail in the early nineteenth century from one where the 
colony was the property of the imperial power to one where the imperial power was engaged in a
civilizing mission). 
268. See Allen Buchanan, Theories of Secession, 26 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 31, 33 n.2 (1997)
(“The consensus among legal scholars at this time is that international law does not recognize a
right to secede in . . . circumstances [other than decolonization], but that it does not unequivocally 
prohibit it either.”).
 269. See U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 2; see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 173; International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 5; G.A. Res. 1541 (XV) (Dec. 15, 1960)
(explaining that self-determination could lead to secession and the formation of a new state, 
association of a territory with an existing state, or integration of a territory into an already existing
state); SURYA P. SHARMA, TERRITORIAL ACQUISITION, DISPUTES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
9 (1997) (“Practice since the establishment of the United Nations leaves no doubt that self-
determination has been transformed into a binding rule of international law (jus cogens).”).  
270. See Achiume, supra note 208, at 712–16 (applying the R2P to refugee crises).
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But what was Belgium’s purchase but merely a costly and reluctant 
discharge of such a responsibility? 
Almost a century later, Judge Hardy Cross Dillard of the 
International Court of Justice would write that “[i]t is for the people to 
determine the destiny of the territory and not the territory the destiny 
of the people.”271 That is a complicated principle to instantiate in a 
world of territorial sovereignty. But the history of the Congo Free State 
helps illustrate what it means in practice: that ultimately the people’s 
claim to self-determination must include, in some form, the ownership
of sovereign control.  
It must be noted that the power to transfer sovereignty can be, and
has been, subject to abuse. History is full of examples of sovereign
rights being effectively stolen through abusive treaties and the like.
Hochschild provides one example from the Congo, in which the chiefs 
of Ngombi and Mafela, in return for “one piece of cloth per month to
each of the undersigned chiefs, besides present of cloth in hand,” 
agreed to:
[F]reely of their own accord, for themselves and their heirs and 
successors for ever . . . give up to the said Association the sovereignty 
and all sovereign and governing rights to all their territories . . . . All 
roads and waterways running through this country, the right of
collecting tolls on the same, and all game, fishing, mining and forest 
rights, are to be the absolute property of the said Association.272 
But such exploitative sales are not the entire story. Though the 
Congo Free State’s status as a personal colony was arguably unique, its 
commodification of sovereign control was not. By 1908, the United 
States had reached the apex of its territorial authority,273 having just 
acquired Puerto Rico and the Philippines from Spain, and was 
grappling with questions of imperial identity.274 But holding aside its 
new colonial possessions, and even holding aside the conquest or 
purchase of territory from Native Americans—a practice that Leopold 
271. Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. Rep. 12, 116, 122 (Oct. 16) (separate
opinion by Dillard, J.).
 272. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 72 (second omission in original). The agreement also
ominously pledged “to assist by labour or otherwise” with the Association’s “works,
improvements or expeditions.” Id. 
273. BARTHOLOMEW H. SPARROW, THE INSULAR CASES AND THE EMERGENCE OF 
AMERICAN EMPIRE 216 (2006) (“[T]he United States never encompassed as large an area as it
did between March 1899 and May 1902.”).
 274. JOSÉ A. CABRANES, CITIZENSHIP AND THE AMERICAN EMPIRE: NOTES ON THE 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP OF PUERTO RICANS 4 (1979). 
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2020] TRANSFERABLE SOVEREIGNTY 1267
and his supporters invoked in the context of the Congo Free State275— 
the majority of the United States’ landmass was in fact acquired 
through transactions, including Louisiana from France in 1803,276 
Florida from Spain in 1819,277 and Alaska from Russia in 1867.278 In 
fact, nearly a decade after Leopold sold Congo to Belgium, the United 
States bought the Virgin Islands from Denmark.279 
Even today, voluntary transfers of territory between states are
constantly altering the map of sovereign power through purchases,
long-term leases, and other transactions. Governments often sell
servitudes to one another280 and lease territory to foreign investors281 in 
ways that directly or indirectly limit their own sovereign control.282 
275. REEVES, supra note 32, at 21–22 (noting that Arntz and Twiss invoked this precedent);
see also Goldmann, supra note 231, at 10–14 (describing how the Germans used the purchase of
territory in Southwest Africa as an initial step towards taking sovereignty). 
276. The United States paid France $15 million for nine hundred thousand square miles of
territory. See KUKLA, supra note 34, at 335.
 277. See Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits, Between the United States of America and 
His Catholic Majesty, Spain-U.S., Feb. 22, 1819, 8 Stat. 252.
278. The United States paid Russia $7.2 million for 586,412 square miles of territory. See
Treaty Concerning the Cession of the Russian Possessions in North America by His Majesty the
Emperor of All the Russians to the United States of America, art. 6, Russ.-U.S., Mar. 30, 1867,
15 Stat. 539.
 279. See Convention Between the United States and Denmark for Cession of the Danish West 
Indies, Den.-U.S., Aug. 4, 1916, 39 Stat. 1706 (purchasing the Danish West Indies and ceding 
claims to portions of Greenland); see also LINDLEY, supra note 35, at 167–68 (describing the
provisions of the treaty).
 280. MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, THE VIABILITY OF TERRITORIAL LEASES IN RESOLVING
INTERNATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTES 91–97 (2010) (providing the main groupings of types
of servitudes). 
281. See, e.g., Duncan Bartlett, Ethiopia Weighs Benefits of Foreign ‘Land Grabs,’ BBC NEWS
(June 10, 2011), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-13725431 [https://perma.cc/QUR4-4XY7];
Alex Spillius, China ‘To Rent Five Per Cent of Ukraine,’ TELEGRAPH (Sept. 24, 2013, 7:18 PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/10332007/China-to-rent-five-per-cent-of-
Ukraine.html [https://perma.cc/Z6CZ-JCGB].
282. Jochen von Bernstorff, The Global “Land-Grab”, Sovereignty and Human Rights, 2
ESIL REFLECTIONS 1, 3 (2013) (noting that when governments enter into large-scale land deals
with foreign investors, “territorial sovereignty is affected for instance if large parts of the territory
is [sic] leased to foreign governments for a period of 99 years, which is a standard clause in these 
land deals”). See generally PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY: WHY 
PRIVATIZATION OF GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND WHAT WE CAN 
DO ABOUT IT (2007) (arguing that the use of private contractors to perform essential government
functions can undermine the effectiveness and morale of public government officials).
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Nations seek control over territory for ports, military bases, 
farmland,283 canals,284 tax revenue, trade gains,285 and other reasons.286 
Such transfers are not necessarily exploitative, or even 
undesirable, in every instance. Like exchanges of property between
private citizens, they can provide means of welfare-enhancing 
exchange. After all, although Leopold’s purchase of sovereign control 
from the Congolese put the horror of the Congo Free State in motion,
it was also Belgium’s eventual purchase from Leopold that brought it
to an end. Of course, the latter is hardly a model to be emulated. The 
Congolese were not part of the negotiation, and ended up being stuck 
with the bill for the purchase, which they effectively had to pay again
in 1960 at the moment of independence.287 However, the fundamental 
problem was not the transfer but the terms: the Congolese were not 
treated as legitimate owners of their own land, or given the power to 
govern it. Once again, Morel himself might be the best source. Even as
he accepted the victory of the reform movement he led, Morel warned 
that “the root of the evil [will remain] untouched . . . till the native of
the Congo becomes once more owner of his land and of the produce 
which it yields.”288 
283. See John Vidal, How Food and Water Are Driving a 21st-Century African Land Grab, 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 6, 2010, 7:06 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2010/ 
mar/07/food-water-africa-land-grab [https://perma.cc/7597-BF2F] (“Ethiopia is only one of 20 or
more African countries where land is being bought or leased for intensive agriculture on an
immense scale in what may be the greatest change of ownership since the colonial era.”).
 284. Jude Webber, Nicaragua Breaks Ground with $50bn Canal, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2014),
http://on.ft.com/1wYBUHe [https://perma.cc/HQK9-32NZ] (describing the Chinese-funded
project).
 285. See Nancy Birdsall, The True True Size of Africa, CTR. FOR GLOB. DEV. BLOG (Nov. 11, 
2010), http://www.cgdev.org/blog/true-true-size-africa [https://perma.cc/6FCW-PHCC] (noting
that sub-Saharan Africa’s “economic size” is roughly equivalent to that of Chicago plus Atlanta,
which is “why Africa’s leaders wish they could overcome the politics of sovereignty and eliminate 
the cost of all those borders—something the Europeans have been working on for half a
century”).
 286. See Andrea Janus, Turks and Caicos Premier ‘Not Closing the Door’ on Canadians’
Caribbean Dreams, CTV NEWS (May 26, 2014, 4:45 PM), http://www.ctvnews.ca/politics/turks-
and-caicos-premier-not-closing-the-door-on-canadians-caribbean-dreams-1.1838466 [https://perma.cc/ 
Q9MM-UY9S] (quoting Peter Goldring, a member of the Canadian parliament, on the century-
old idea of acquiring Turks and Caicos: “The United States has a Hawaii. Why can’t Canada have
a Hawaii?”); The Market for State Territory: Pass the Hemlock, ECONOMIST (Nov. 19, 2011), 
https://www.economist.com/international/2011/11/19/pass-the-hemlock [https://perma.cc/53K7-
RGUS] (“Arturas Zuokas, the mayor of Vilnius, has made a teasing offer to Greece; he suggested
his country acquire an island as ‘an exclusive place for rest in the Mediterranean’ and ‘a great 
global advert for Lithuania’, featuring a spa, museums and a theatre.”).
 287. See supra Part I.C. 
288. HOCHSCHILD, supra note 1, at 272.
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C. The Relevance of the Framework Today: From Greenland to 
Kashmir
The horror of the Congo Free State was in many ways unique not
just in scale, but in terms of its legal structure. It was, as Jesse Siddall
Reeves put it, a “monstrosity,”289 and over the past century
international law has driven a stake into its heart; the kind of atrocities 
King Leopold inflicted on the Congolese, and the way in which he did
so, are forbidden. What, then, is to be gained by studying this
depressing historical episode, other than cautionary tales? 
Our first major contention has been that, despite Leopold’s abuse 
of the mechanism, the transfer of sovereign territory by sale was not
and has not been repudiated by international law. To the contrary, it
was the mechanism by which his rule was brought to an end. And if one 
closes the chapter too quickly on the history of the Congo Free State,
it would be too easy to miss that final line.
But what relevance does it have in the modern world, where the
right to self-determination receives broad support, and substantive 
rules of international law forbid the kind of maniacal exploitation and 
murder in which Leopold engaged? Can the theory we have 
described—of using sales, including forced sales, as a solution to the 
problem of bad or oppressive governance—help address contemporary
challenges, or is it simply a historical curio? 
As this Article was being written, those questions came to the fore 
of international political discussion in a very odd way. Word got out 
that President Trump was interested in purchasing Greenland from 
Denmark. It is hard to know how serious this idea ever was, and 
whether he truly meant to pursue it, but it was earnest enough that 
Trump cancelled a meeting with Danish Prime Minister Mette
Frederiksen when she rejected the idea. Likewise, press coverage was 
a mixture of serious,290 humorous,291 and indignant.292 
289. REEVES, supra note 32, at 74 (quoting an unnamed diplomat).
290. Scott R. Anderson, Why Trump Can’t Buy Greenland, LAWFAREBLOG (Aug. 16, 2019, 
1:12 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-trump-cant-buy-greenland [https://perma.cc/2Y8T-
VBRT].
 291. Andy Borowitz, Denmark Offers To Buy U.S., NEW YORKER: BOROWITZ REP. (Aug. 
16, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/humor/borowitz-report/denmark-offers-to-buy-us
[https://perma.cc/C8UT-69VH].
 292. Dana Milbank, Opinion, The U.S. Must Take Greenland by Force!, WASH. POST (Aug. 
19, 2019, 6:46 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-us-must-take-greenland-by-
force/2019/08/19/fc87ada8-c2b3-11e9-9986-1fb3e4397be4_story.html [https://perma.cc/E9YL-
Y86V]. 
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But critics of the President’s “plan”—if that is what it was—went 
too far when they claimed that the United States could not purchase
sovereign territory.293 Again, the acquisition of territory via purchase is 
not forbidden by international law. Trump’s error was in assuming that 
he would have to buy Greenland from Denmark, which, he said, 
“essentially owns it.”294 Greenland and Denmark were both quick to
correct his mildly Leopoldian misconception of their relationship.295 
Unfortunately, the circumstances of the story, and the proponent
of the deal, have understandably made it hard for analysts to get a clear 
view of the underlying questions about the legality and potential value
in purchased transfers of sovereign territory. Because that is the 
question that interests us here, let us alter a few of those circumstances 
so as to better focus the lens. Greenland is a former colony, home to
roughly fifty thousand people whose standards of living lag far behind 
the Danish metropole.296 Let us assume that those fifty thousand
people are suffering even worse, and not despite but because of their 
relationship to Denmark, which instead of granting autonomy to the 
island has tightened its grasp and shut down any democratic 
responsiveness. For good measure, let us also say that the Danes are 
plundering the resources that President Trump apparently sees as 
valuable and that the U.S. president is a less divisive figure, with a 
proven track record of respecting the rule of law.
In that stylized scenario, if the United States offered to purchase 
Greenland—perhaps for a lump sum payment to Denmark, plus $10
million to each of the native Greenlanders, along with U.S.
citizenship—what would the reaction be? What if the Greenlanders 
themselves proposed the sale? In such circumstances, it is easy to
imagine that “principled” objections would fall by the wayside, and the 
293. Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, Sure, Trump Can Buy Greenland. But Why Does He
Think It’s Up to Denmark?, POLITICO MAG. (Aug. 23, 2019), https://www.politico.com/magazine/ 
story/2019/08/23/donald-trump-greenland-purchase-sovereignty-denmark-227859 [https://perma.cc/
3FE6-RBGZ] [hereinafter Blocher & Gulati, Sure]. 
294. Scott Neuman, No Joke: Trump Really Does Want To Buy Greenland, NPR (Aug. 19,
2019, 2:32 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/08/19/752274659/no-joke-trump-really-does-want-to-
buy-greenland [https://perma.cc/34KE-HWQ7].
 295. Id.
 296. Rebecca Hersher, Numbers Lie Even More Than Usual in Greenland, NPR (Apr. 21,
2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2016/04/21/475003055/numbers-lie-even-
more-than-usual-in-greenland [https://perma.cc/74KK-CCGG] (noting that male life expectancy
in Greenland is a decade lower than in Denmark, and that at least a quarter of the island’s 56,000
residents “still live in tiny settlements and do not have access to basic services like adequate
emergency health care and schools”).
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major questions would be about the practicalities, like what
supermajority of Greenlanders would have to approve the deal, how to 
effectuate the money transfer, what legal status Greenland would have
within the U.S. system, and so on. We have no easy answers to those
questions, as they depend in part on domestic law. Our point is simply
that they are consistent with the legality—even desirability—of the sale 
itself, and also with the principle of self-determination. 
We can even complicate the scenario and say that Denmark plays 
its part and really leans in to the Leopoldian role, refusing to give up 
the colony in which it has invested so much. The problem for that 
position is that it did not work even for Leopold, and a century’s worth 
of growth in the direction of self-determination, remedial secession, 
and decolonization would leave the Danes with even less of a
foundation to stand on. This is not to say that their claim of territorial 
integrity would fall by the wayside—sanctity of borders remains a 
foundational principle of international law—only that its foundations
have been so eroded that it would probably, like Leopold’s, eventually
give way in the face of determined international opposition. And the
Danes would, as Leopold did, in all likelihood seek to negotiate some
kind of a deal.
Improving the standard of living of Greenlanders might not 
appear to be a sufficiently serious crisis to rethink the status quo in
international law. So let us close with a more pressing case: that of
Kashmir. As of this writing in March 2020, that region is in immense
turmoil because of the removal of the special protections that were
promised by Hindu-majority India to Muslim-majority Kashmir in
1947.297 Ever since the British partitioned the Indian subcontinent into
India and Pakistan, the two have been engaged in a tussle over 
Kashmir. The cost of that struggle has, in significant part, been borne 
by the people of Kashmir itself. Under international law, as per the 
dictates of the United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan and 
the U.N. Security Council, from as far back as 1948–49, the people of 
Kashmir were supposed to have a right of self-determination—that is,
the right to have a plebiscite to decide which country they want to join
297. E.g., Jeffrey Gettleman, Suhasini Raj, Kai Schultz & Hari Kumar, India Revokes
Kashmir’s Special Status, Raising Fears of Unrest, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/05/world/asia/india-pakistan-kashmir-jammu.html [https://perma.cc/ 
NK4U-LULM]; Amy Kazmin, India Accuses Pakistan of Stoking Violence in the Kashmir Valley, 
FIN. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/acc1a028-d1d9-11e9-8367-807ebd53ab77 
[https://perma.cc/644H-N9ML].
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or whether they wish to be independent.298 Neither India nor Pakistan, 
however, has allowed that to happen,299 perhaps because both nations 
realize that their behavior over the years toward the Kashmiris might 
dissuade them from wanting to join either country.300 
Imagine, though, a world in which India and Pakistan were not 
fighting over Kashmir using soldiers, warplanes, nuclear threats, and
terrorists. Instead, imagine that there was going to be the promised 
United Nations–administered vote where the Kashmiri people would 
get to decide which offer they would take from a variety of nations 
vying for Kashmir to join them. Each country, including India and 
Pakistan, would have to offer the Kashmiris a package of financial,
economic, and political rights. Put differently, imagine if India and 
Pakistan were to use the financial resources they have been expending 
on fighting against each other to instead make attractive offers to the
Kashmiris. And imagine also that other countries such as China, which
is nearby, were allowed to make offers, so that there would enough
competition to bid the price up. Surely, this would produce a better 
state of affairs.
CONCLUSION
The horror of the Congo Free State may seem distant, but its 
legacy lives on in the Congo, and the forces animating it still shape the 
modern world. Across the globe, states continue to make calculations
about the value of sovereignty and try to adjust their “holdings” 
accordingly, even as the people living in that territory often struggle to 
make their own rights and interests part of the equation. 
Such scenarios raise questions about the end of sovereignty, not as 
a concept or legal tool—though scholars are also exploring that 
angle301—but as exercised by particular entities in particular places. 
298. For a discussion of this history, see Karen Heymann, Earned Sovereignty for Kashmir: 
The Legal Methodology To Avoiding A Nuclear Holocaust, 19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 153, 154–68
(2003). More contemporaneously, see generally Ahmed Farooq, Kashmir Dispute Redux: What
of the Right of Self-Determination? (Sept. 10, 2019), FORDHAM INT’L L.J. ONLINE, 
https://www.fordhamilj.org/iljonline/2019/9/10/kashmir-dispute-redux-what-of-the-right-of-self-
determination [https://perma.cc/V9GA-E3Q7]. 
299. Heymann, supra note 298, at 162–63.
 300. See Maria Abi-Habib, Jalaluddin Mughal & Salman Masood, In Pakistan-Held Kashmir, 
Growing Calls for Independence, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/ 
09/19/world/asia/pakistan-kashmir-independence.html [https://perma.cc/ZA4Q-JQ6B]. 
301. See generally JOSEPH A. CAMILLERI & JIM FALK, THE END OF SOVEREIGNTY?: THE 
POLITICS OF A SHRINKING AND FRAGMENTING WORLD (1992); STEPHEN D. KRASNER,
SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999).
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Whatever its trajectory, sovereignty and its connection to territory
remain important to the world order;302 consider how many people
struggle and die every day to defend, alter, or cross borders. But while 
international law has traditionally focused on ways in which 
sovereignty can be acquired, less attention has been paid to how it can 
be given up peacefully. Perhaps secession is the counterpart to
conquest. What, then, is the bookend concept for a purchased cession?
These questions remain a part of international law and practice.
Millions of people still live in colonies whose connection to the
metropole is tenuous or disfavored—Americans need look no further 
than the millions of U.S. citizens living in our own colony, Puerto Rico.
In an era of unprecedented mass displacement, refugees face 
oppression at home and resistance abroad, as persecution and states’
economic self-interest combine to deny them safety. King Leopold’s 
ghost haunts not only the Congo, but also international law. Our hope
is to help exorcise it. The right of sovereign control, which includes the
right to transfer sovereign control, must ultimately lie with the people.
It should be an instrument to protect their interests, not one used to 
oppress them.
302. Alexander B. Murphy, The Sovereign State System as Political-Territorial Ideal:
Historical and Contemporary Considerations, in  STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT
81, 81 (Thomas J. Biersteker & Cynthia Weber eds., 1996) (“[I]n most instances the existence of
a system of more or less distinct territorial units as the foundation for human governance is not 
even questioned.”).
